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ABSTRACT
ON THE NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM WITH
MULTIPLE INPUTS UNDER A CARBON EMISSION
CONSTRAINT
Sibel So¨zu¨er
M.S. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. U¨lku¨ Gu¨rler
September, 2012
In this thesis, we consider two problems in the newsvendor setting with multiple
inputs, under a carbon emission constraint and non-linear production functions.
In the first problem, we assume a strict carbon cap and find the optimal produc-
tion quantity and input allocation that will maximize the expected profit under
this constraint. In the second problem, we consider an emission trading scheme
where an advance purchase of carbon emission permits is made at an initial price
before the random demand is realized. When the demand is realized and new
carbon trade prices are revealed, it is possible to buy additional permits or to
sell an excess amount. The aim is to decide on the optimal allocation of the
inputs as well as the carbon trading policy so as to maximize the expected profit.
In both problems, the production quantity is linked to multiple inputs via the
Cobb-Douglas and Leontief production functions. Optimal policy structures are
derived and numerical examples are provided.
Keywords: Production, Newsvendor Problem, Inventory Management, Produc-
tion Function, Multiple Inputs, Carbon Emission, Carbon Cap, Emission Permit
Trading, Cobb-Douglas, Leontief.
iii
O¨ZET
KARBON EMI˙SYON KISITI ALTINDA BI˙RDEN FAZLA
GI˙RDI˙NI˙N OLDUG˘U GAZETECI˙ C¸OCUK PROBLEMI˙
Sibel So¨zu¨er
Endu¨stri Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Dr. U¨lku¨ Gu¨rler
Eylu¨l, 2012
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, karbon kısıtı ve lineer olmayan u¨retim foksiyonları altında birden
fazla girdinin oldug˘u gazeteci c¸ocuk modeli iki problemde ele alınmıs¸tır. I˙lk prob-
lemde katı bir karbon kotasının oldug˘u varsayılmıs¸ ve bu kısıt altında beklenen
karı en iyileyecek u¨retim miktarı ve girdi dag˘ılımı bulunmus¸tur. I˙kinci problemde
ise talep belli olmadan o¨nce karbon emisyon permilerinin erkenden alınmasına da
olanak tanıyan bir emisyon ticareti mekanizması ele alınmıs¸tır. Talep belli olduk-
tan ve yeni karbon borsası fiyatları ac¸ıklandıktan sonra da permi alım-satımı
yapmak mu¨mku¨ndu¨r. Amac¸ beklenen karı en iyileyecek girdi dag˘ılımına ve kar-
bon permi ticareti politikasına karar vermektir. Her iki problemde de u¨retim
miktarı, girdiler ile Cobb-Douglas ve Leontief u¨retim fonksiyonları aracılıg˘ıyla
ilis¸kilendirilmis¸tir. Politikaların analitik yapısı bulunmus¸ ve sayısal o¨rnekler ver-
ilmis¸tir.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : U¨retim, Gazeteci C¸ocuk Problemi, Envanter Yo¨netimi,
U¨retim Fonksiyonları, Birden Fazla Girdi, Karbon Emisyonu, Karbon Kotası,
Emisyon Permi Borsası, Cobb-Douglas, Leontief .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Global warming is one of the most critical environmental problems. If not in-
tervined immediately, it may accelerate climate change and eventually lead to a
posibble environmental disaster. Ever since the Industrial Revolution, the con-
sumption of fossil fuels is increasing continuously that causes higher emission of
greenhouse gases (GHG), which is known to be the main reason for global warm-
ing. Of these greenhouse gases, Carbon Dioxide has the most significant affect on
global warming. While its concentration in the atmosphere was about 280-290
ppm in the 18th and 19th centuries, it has exceeded 350 ppm in recent years and
has been increasing 1 ppm each year [28].
In the last three decades, several initiatives have been started by the author-
ities in order to reduce global warming. The first of these initiatives is the First
World Climate Conference organized by World Meteorological Organization in
1979. This conference later led to the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 as well as the establishment World Climate
Programme and the World Climate Research Programme. The Second Climate
Conference in 1990 was ”an important step towards a global climate treaty” and
led to the establishment of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) [53]. The most significant development for climate change
intervension is the Kyoto Protocol that is linked to UNFCCC.
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Kyoto Protocol is an internationally binding agreement that has tangible tar-
gets for reducing GHG emissions. It was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 Decem-
ber 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. 37 industrialized countries
committed themselves to reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5 % against
1990 levels over the five-year period 2008-2012. Currently, 191 states have ratified
the protocol [53]. Even though the primary aim is to meet the emission targets
with national measures, Kyoto Protocol offers three market-based mechanisms:
1. Emissions trading, known as ’the carbon market’
2. Clean development mechanism (CDM)
3. Joint implementation (JI).
Kyoto Protocol has established an emission allowance mechanism in order
to monitor carbon emission levels. While UNFCCC determines these emission
allowances for each state, the states are allowed to spare their emission permits
and sell the excess capacity to the countries that exceed their targets. Similarly,
in a local setting, the state may allocate its emission allowance between firms,
and each firm may trade its permits with other firms. This leads to a national,
regional or a global carbon permit market where the players trade their emission
allowances.
Clean Development Mechanism allows a country with emission-reduction com-
mitment to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries.
This mechanism enables industrialized countries to earn saleble certified emission
reduction (CER) credits while helping sustainable development in other countries.
Joint Implementation offers meeting emission targets through earning emis-
sion reduction units (ERUs). In this mechanism, countries may invest or transfer
technology to the host country where emission reductions are cheaper compared
to reducing emission domestically and meet their targets in a more cost-effective
way.
Under Kyoto Protocol, especially carbon trade has been gaining impor-
tance. Emission trading schemes have been established in European Union (EU
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ETS), New Zealand (NZ ETS) and the USA (Chicago Climate Exchange). Of
these schemes, European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which was
launched in 2005 under a cap-and-trade scheme by the European Union coun-
tries, is the largest multinational emission trading scheme in the world. Under
this scheme, EU ETS allocates carbon permits to the firms and the firms with
higher emissions than their permits has to buy credit from the market or pay a
penalty. In Phase I (2005-2007), the total annual cap was 2.1 billion tonnes CE
and it covered more that ten thousand companies in 27 EU member countries. In
Phase II (2008-2012), the cap has been cut by 10%. For Phase III (2013-2020),
the emission allocation will be reduced by 21% from 2005 [42]. The EU ETS
serves as a spot market as well as a futures market. Transaction volume has been
increased from 262 million tonnes CE in 2005 to 5 billion tonnes CE in 2009 [8].
Turkey ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 5 February 2009. Turkey’s commitment
to emission reduction has started in 2012 through Voluntary/Verified Emission
Reductions (VER) activities. These activities consist of investment support for
renewable energy, forestry, recycling and energy efficiency projects that help re-
ducing carbon emission.
These developments indicate a growing attention to carbon emission and its
impacts in the world and in Turkey. Emission trading schemes will create new
paradigms in the industry with increasing transaction volumes. In this new set-
ting, the companies will be forced to compete in production, growth and innova-
tion under carbon emission restrictions. Our aim in this thesis is to study two
production problems of a single item with multiple inputs under a carbon emission
constraint and non-linear production functions in the newsvendor setting.
In Problem 1, we consider the production of a single item with multiple in-
puts and stochastic demand under a carbon cap regulation and aim to find the
production policy that maximizes the expected profit. We construct our prob-
lem based on the classical newsvendor problem. In addition, we consider the
production costs and emission level which is restricted by the carbon cap. We
assume a production model with multiple inputs. The relationship between the
inputs and the production quantity is given by a non-linear production function.
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The objective in this problem is to maximize the expected profit. The decision
variables are the production quantity and the allocation of the inputs.
In our analysis of Problem 1, we study the problem for Cobb-Douglas and
Leontief production functions. We consider several subproblems of the main prob-
lem and then synthesize our findings. In the Cobb-Douglas production function
model, we show the concavity of the objective function under certain conditions
for no carbon cap constraint and derive the optimal production policy in gen-
eral. When we impose a carbon cap restriction, the optimal production policy is
found by evaluating the extrema and the limits. For Leontief production function
model, we are able to provide a solution set when there is no carbon cap con-
straint and derive the optimal production policy directly with a binding carbon
cap constraint.
In Problem 2, we consider the production of a single item with multiple inputs
and stochastic demand under an emission trading scheme and aim to design
a carbon permit contract that maximizes the expected profit. We assume an
emission trading scheme that allows advance purchase of carbon emission permits
at an initial price before the random demand is realized. When the demand is
realized and new carbon market prices are revealed, it is possible to buy additional
permits or to sell an excess amount. We formulate this problem with backward
two-period dynamic programming. The main difference with Problem 1 is that
in Problem 2, the production occurs after the demand is realized (and hence
known) and carbon emission restriction is not hard in the sense that trading is
possible. Moreover, in Problem 2, we assume that the demand is fully satisfied.
The objective is to maximize the expected profit. The decision variables are the
initial carbon permit amount, traded carbon amount and the allocation of the
inputs.
We study Problem 2 for Cobb-Douglas and Leontief production functions.
We consider several subproblems of the main problem and then synthesize our
findings in order to derive analytical structures for the optimal carbon trading
policy. For the Cobb-Douglas production function model, under revealed demand
and carbon market prices, we establish that the optimal policy consists of three
4
regions for carbon trading: buy region, sell region and no-trade region. The
advance permit purchase contract policy is derived and the objective function is
shown to be concave. For the Leontief production function model, the optimal
policy consists of two regions for the optimal carbon trading policy: buy region
and sell region. We also derive the advance permit purchase contract policy and
show that the objective function is concave.
As will be shown in our analysis, the Cobb-Douglas models provide richer
problem settings and in some cases subsume the results for the Leontief models.
Therefore, our numerical study is based on the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion models for both problems. We present sensitivity analysis for both problems
under different parameters in order to provide some managerial insight on the
problems. For Problem 1, we additionally provide an illustrative example based
on a real (published) study of agricultural production and analyze the optimal
production policy performance. In the illustrative agriculture example, we study
the greenhouse tomato production where the inputs are fertilizer, chemical, la-
bor, machinery and water for irrigation. Under a carbon cap, we observe that
carbon cap tightness and demand variability have significant affects on the op-
timal production policy. The results indicate that the production quantity, the
expected profit and the service level decrease steeply for increasing carbon cap
tightness after 30%. Another observation is that higher demand variance yield
higher production quantity, but lower expected profit. We also observe that the
carbon emission of greenhouse tomato production can be decreased by at least
35% without any significant effect on the expected profit and service level. Ac-
cording to our observations, this result may be obtained by increasing machinery,
fertilizer usage, chemical usage and labor by around 5%, 20%, 50% and 100%
respectively, and decrease water usage by 70%.
Additionally, we studied in a limited parameter setting the impact of tech-
nology improvements. We show that the carbon emission can be reduced by
improving the technology level rather than changing the input allocations and
decreasing the production quantity. Under a given carbon cap, we infer that,
compared to producing with the given technology level, improving technology
may even provide side benefits such as higher service levels and possibly higher
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net expected profits depending on the technology improvement cost. For instance,
under a 39% carbon emission reduction by a carbon cap, a 100% improvement in
the technology increase the service level from 88.7% to 93.9% and result an addi-
tional 12,891 TL expected profit before considering the technology improvement
cost.
The sensitivity analysis for Problem 1 indicates that when our production
system relies more on the input that emits less carbon, the expected profit is
affected less by the carbon cap. In the production systems that rely on high
carbon emitting input, the percentage decrease in the expected profit is between
18.7% and 28.2% under a 50% emission reduction by a carbon cap. On the
other hand, we only have 3.1% and 1.1% decrease in the expected profit in the
production systems that rely on low carbon emitting input. This finding provides
evidence on the importance of swiching to less carbon emitting inputs.
The sensitivity study we conduct for Problem 2 shows that relying on high
carbon emitting resources leads to become more dependent on the carbon trade
market. The results indicate that when the production system mostly depends
on the low cost-high carbon emitting input, we tend to purchase twice as much
permit with the contract and expect to be twice as active in the emission trading
scheme.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we review the literature on the classical newsvendor problem,
constrained newsvendor problem, capacity reservations and spot markets and pro-
duction models involving carbon emission restrictions. In Chapter 3, we present
a detailed review on the production function with an emphasis on the Cobb-
Douglas and Leontief production functions. In Chapter 4, we introduce Problem
1 in detail, derive the optimal production policy with some structural expres-
sions. In Chapter 5, analytical results of the optimal carbon contract design is
derived for Problem 2. In Chapter 6, we work on a numerical example and discuss
the sensitivities of the both problems with respect to the problem parameters.
Finally, in Chapter 7 concluding remarks are presented.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we briefly discuss the related literature with emphasis on the
works that are directly related with our models either from a methodological
perspective or in terms of model settings.
One of the classical problems in the inventory management literature is the
newsvendor problem. The analysis of this problem provides key insights for man-
aging inventory in the fashion, airline and hospitality industries. The newsvendor
problem is presented by Scarf [44]. It is later developed by other researchers as
presented in [25], [41].
In the newsvendor problem, the buyer is interested in determining the optimal
inventory policy to satisfy the demand for a single product in a single period
under a probabilistic demand framework. The buyer is allowed to replenish his
inventory only at the beginning of the the period at a given unit purchasing cost
from the supplier. Any remaining inventory at the end of the period is assumed
to be disposed of or sold at a discounted price. If the realized demand is greater
than the inventory on hand, then the buyer forgoes some profit or even may
lose the goodwill of the customer. The expected profit is given by the expected
revenue minus the purchasing cost and the expected costs of overestimating and
underestimating demand. Under the profit maximization objective, the optimal
inventory policy structure is derived.
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There are many extensions to the single period newsvendor problem. Re-
searchers studied the newsvendor problem with different objective functions and
different supplier pricing policies. They also considered multi-location, multi-
period and multi-product extensions of the newsvendor problem. Our scope in
this thesis is limited to the newsvendor problem with multiple resources under
a constraint on resources. Our models involve production functions that express
the production quantity of a product as a function of the resources. However, to
our knowledge, there have been no study that considers production functions in
the newsvendor setting. Therefore, we consider newsvendor extensions involving
multiple resources and multiple products with budget or capacity constraints.
2.1 Newsvendor models with a single resource
constraint
Nahmias and Schmidt [36] is among the earlier works that discuss the single
period inventory (newsvendor) problem with multiple products under a single
constraint on capacity or budget. They provide four heuristics that require fewer
computations than the Lagrange multiplier approach in order to find the optimal
order quantities for the products and examine the performance of each heuristic.
Gallego and Moon [12] suggest several extensions to the newsvendor model
based on [44] one of which is the multi-product case under a linear budget con-
straint. They form the Lagrangian function and develop a simple solution algo-
rithm. In the algorithm, they first solve the problem without the budget con-
straint. If the budget constraint is not satisfied, they set an arbitrary value for
the Lagrange multiplier. Then they compute the optimal production quantities
under that value and evaluate the budget constraint. They increase the value
of the Lagrange multiplier and if the cost exceeds the budget; otherwise, they
decrease the value of the Lagrange multiplier. They continue with their seach
until they find the value of the Lagrange multiplier that satisfies the constraint
with equality.
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Hadley and Whitin [15] consider the newsvendor problem with multiple prod-
ucts under a capacity constraint. Their solution algoritm is based on a search
for the Lagrangian multiplier that satisfies the necessary conditions. First, the
problem is solved by ignoring the budget constraint and the optimum order quan-
tity for each product is found. Then, these values are plugged into the budget
constraint to see if they satisfy the equation. Otherwise, the budget constaint is
assumed to be binding and the Lagrangian approach is used with the same proce-
dure that is proposed in [12]. However, they relax the nonnegativity constraints
and neglect to consider the lower bounds of the order quantities in their model.
Abdel-Malek and Montanari [3] address the multi-product problem under
stochastic demand framework with a budget restriction and improve the solution
methodology for the model in [15]. They divide the solution space by determining
two thresholds for the budget ranges: one for relaxing the budget constraint and
one for relaxing the nonnegativity constraint. In the first range, the budget is
abundant and the optimal solution is given by the unconstrained problem. In
the second range, only the budget constaint is binding and the optimal order
quantities yielded by the Lagrange approach are all positive. In the last range,
the budget is too tight and nonnegativity constraints are binding. They illustrate
their procedure in numerical examples.
These papers consider independent demand distribution for each product.
There are also studies on the newsvendor model with substitutable products.
However, a similar structure can be observed in multi-product and multi-resource
problems where some resources are common in multiple products. In addition,
these models are closer to the scope of this thesis.
Gerchak and Henig [13] formulate a single period newsvendor model for se-
lecting optimal component stock levels in an assemble-to-order system. They
assume a system with multiple products that have common components. They
solve this problem in two stages. In the first stage, they determine the allocation
of the common components between the products for a given component stock
level so as to maximize the revenue. In the second stage, they use his information
to select the optimal stock levels.
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Jonsson and Silver [21] also deals with assemble-to-order systems with mul-
tiple products and multiple components under a budget constraint. Some of
the components are assumed to be unique to specific products while others are
common to two or more products. The components are ordered before product
demands are revealed, but the assembly of the products begin after the demand is
known. They also assume normally distributed demand. The aim is to determine
component quantities under a budget constraint so as to maximize the expected
number of units of end items sold. They consider the assembly of two products
with three components: one common component and one unique component for
each. They develop a simple heuristic for solving the problem.
Jonsson and Silver [22] later extend their model in [21] to address the prob-
lem with multiple components and products. They formulate the problem as a
two-stage stochastic programming problem with a recourse which is extremely
difficult to solve optimally. They develop three heuristics for solving the problem
under some simplifying assumptions. One of the heuristics performed well for the
practical case of continuous demand distributions under large budgets.
Harrison and Van Mieghem [17] address the multi-product newsvendor prob-
lem with multiple resources which are capital, labor and production technology.
They aim to find the optimal investment strategy in resources under uncertain
product demand. After the demands are realized, the production quantities for
each product are determined given these resources. They also use stochastic pro-
gramming with recourse to solve the problem and provide structural results of
the optimal solution.
The studies presented above share a common approach in the solution method-
ology. First, they find the optimal production quantities for each product for a
given resource level. Then, they use this information in determining the optimal
resource level. We also use a similar approach for solving both problems.
These cited works are related to Problem 1 in our study in the sense that
they primarily use Lagrangean relaxation methodology. However, in terms of
model settings, they are different: These works consider multiple products and
a constraint on resources that may be used for all (or some) of these products.
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However, the resource usage is linear in all of these models.
2.2 Newsvendor models with resource contract
design
In Problem 2, we aim to develop an advance permit purchase policy under random
demand and carbon market prices. In this sense, Problem 2 can be treated as
a newsvendor problem with a cash constraint or a capacity reservation and spot
market alternative. Another similar model is given by options contract. There-
fore, it is important to study the literature on options and capacity reservation
contracts with spot market alternative.
We begin our discussion on the works with a constraint on cash avaliable for
goods replenishment.
Buzacott and Zhang [6] incorporate asset-based financing into production de-
cisions in the multi-period newsvendor setting. They consider a Stackelberg game
between the bank and retailer, where the bank is the leader. In this formulation,
there is no exogenous budget constraint. Instead, the retailer determines the loan
size as well as the order quantity so as to maximize the expected revenue. On
the other hand, the bank determines the interest rate and loan limit that maxi-
mizes its expected profit. They find three regions for the retailer’s optimal loan
borrowing policy. In the first region, the retailer does not borrow. In the other
regions, the retailer borrows with or without backruptcy risk.
Li et al. [34] examine the simultaneous inventory and financial decisions of a
firm under demand uncertainty. They study a discrete time multi-period model.
In each period, the firm has to determine how much money to borrow, how much
dividend to issue and how much to issue so as to maximize the expected present
value of the dividends net of capital subscriptions. They derive a myopic optimal
policy.
Xu and Birge [55] consider joint production and financing decisions under
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demand uncertainty and financial constraints in a single period. The objective is
to maximize the expected future value of the firm. They derive structural results
for the optimal production and financial policy under market imperfections such
as tax and bankruptcy costs. They also examine the debt capacity for the firm.
Lai et al. [30] study the impact of financial constraints on the supply chain
contracts in the newsvendor setting. They assume a Stackelberg game between a
supplier and a retailer, in which the supplier is the leader and each party aims to
maximize its expected profit. They examine the model with three supply chain
contracts: preorder, consignment or the combination of both. Under preorder
contract, the retailer owns the inventory while in the consignment contract, the
supplier takes full inventory risk. The supplier decides on the supply chain con-
tract and determines the wholesale price for the preorder and/or the commission
for the consingment order. On the other hand, the retailer determines the optimal
order quantity for a given contract and price offer from the supplier. Simultane-
ously, both parties determine how much loan to borrow from an external financial
market in order to finance their production and inventory related decisions. Lai et
al. derive the optimal policy structures and show that in the presence of financial
constraints, the supplier prefers to share the inventory risk with the retailer.
There are also some works with real options to alleviate either existing or
potential resource limitations. Barnes-Schuster et al. [4] studies the role of con-
tracts with options in a two-period production problem with correlated stochastic
demand. At the beginning of the first period, the buyer places firm orders for
both periods and purchases options to be exercised in the second period. At the
end of the first period, the buyer observes the first period demand and updates
the demand for period two. Then he decides how much to order through exercis-
ing options. On the other hand, the supplier determines the optimal wholesale
price as well as option and exercise prices that maximizes the expected profit.
They analyze the problem under decentralized system and channel coordination
and derive the structure of the optimal policy.
Serel et al. [46] consider sourcing decisions of a firm in the presence of a capac-
ity reservation contract and spot market alternative in the newsvendor setting.
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In their models, they allow simultaneous use of both options and assume deter-
ministic contract and spot prices. They investigate the actions of the buyer and
the long-term supplier for two types of periodic review policies: the two-number
policy and the base stock policy. The supplier determines the contract price. The
buyer decides how much capacity to reserve so as to maximize its expected profit
under predetermined spot and contract prices. The unused capacity has no value
for the supplier or the buyer and it cannot be sold to a third party. They derive
an optimal policy structure for the buyer under the base stock policy where they
determine a threshold price and order from either the supplier, the spot market
or both under given contract and spot market prices.
These papers consider both seller and the buyer. In addition, they both
consider deterministic prices for the future capacity purchase. In [4], these are
given by the exercise prices of the options whereas in [46], these are given by
the spot market prices and the contract prices with the supplier. There are also
extensions that assume stochastic price structures for the future purchases.
Serel [45] extends the model in [46] to investigate a multi-period capacity reser-
vation contracts when there is uncertainty on the availability of the resources in
the spot market. The supplier guarantees the delivery of the reserved capacity
while the buyer may also acquire the input from the spot market if available. In
this model, the spot prices are stochastic and dependends on the available quan-
tity. The reservation contract with the long-term supplier involves two terms:
capacity price and reservation quantity. The buyer determines the optimal in-
ventory control policy and the reservation quantity while the supplier sets the
contract price to maximize its expected profit. He derives the optimal policy
structures for the buyer and the supplier. Numerically, he shows that the uncer-
tainty in the input market leads to an increase in the amount of reserved capacity
at a lower price.
Wu et al. [54] investigates the capacity contract agreement under a Stack-
elberg game between a buyer and a seller. The only source of uncertainty is
assumed to be the spot market price and the buyer’s demand is given as a func-
tion of the spot market price. The seller sets the option price and exercise price
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to maximize its profits. Given these prices, the buyer purchase options from the
seller and decides how much options to exercise when the spot market prices are
revealed. In this model, the buyer is allowed to sell excess capacity in the spot
market. The objective function for the buyer is defined by a utility function which
includes the willingness-to-pay function as inverse of the demand function at a
given spot price. The solution to the buyer’s problem is given in two stages. In
the first stage, the spot market price is assumed to be revealed and the buyer
determines how many options to exercise and how much capacity to buy from the
spot market at a given that price so as to maximize its utility. In the second stage,
the buyer finds the optimal amount of options to purchase in order to maximize
its expected utility under a spot price distribution. The optimal policy structure
seems to be similar to the structure in [46] since it also suggests a threshold price
for determining the option exercise and/or spot market purchase policy.
Spinler and Huchzermeier [49] adapt [54] to include more uncertainties in the
model. They define a random variable for the state of economy and express all
uncertainties in their model as a function of this variable. On top of random spot
prices, thet consider random demand for the buyer. They also assume stochastic
cost structures of long-term contracts and spot market sales for the seller. In
addition, they consider an exogeneous risk of not being able to find a last-minute
buyer as a function of spot market price. They show that the structure of the
optimal policies in their model share similarities with the policy structures in
[54].
2.3 Inventory models with carbon emission con-
siderations
In addition to the constrained newsvendor problem and capacity reservations
contracts under stochastic demand, finally we consider the studies on production
problems involving carbon emission restrictions. The environmental regulations
by the authorities and increasing environmental awareness of the customers force
the industry to take some measures to decrase their carbon footprints. The
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growing interest in sustainable systems in the industry leads many reseaches to
focus their attention on this area. In the last three years, there is an increasing
number of operations management (OM) researcher that are interested in carbon-
emission related issues. They revisit well known problems such as lot-sizing and
newsvendor problems, and study them under this new paradigm.
Benjaafar et al. [5] investigate how to involve the carbon emissions concerns
into the operational decision-making models. They consider the economic order
quantity (EOQ) model in which the objective is to find the optimal ordering
quantity so as to minimize the sum of the fixed ordering cost, inventory holding
cost and procurement cost under a deterministic demand. They also assume
that the carbon emission has a similar structure to the cost function. Through
numerical examples, they provide insights that highlight the impact of operational
decisions such as procurement, production, and inventory management on the
carbon emissions and emphasize the importance of the operational models in
assessing the benefits of investments in more carbon-efficient technologies. They
suggest other models to be studies further one of which is the newsvendor problem
under a carbon emission restriction.
Hua et al [20] consider a lot sizing problem under a cap-and-trade mechanism
and aim to discuss how to manage the carbon footprints in the inventory control.
They study the EOQ model in this setting, and examine the impacts of carbon
trade, carbon price and carbon capacity on the optimal ordering policy, carbon
emission and total cost. They derive the optimal ordering policy analytically and
provide managerial insights.
Benjaafar et al. [7] apply the EOQ problem with a cap on carbon emissions.
They derive the optimal ordering policy under some conditions and analytically
support the observations made in [5]. They provide a condition under which it
is possible to reduce emissions by modifying order quantities. They also pro-
vide conditions under which the relative reduction in emissions is greater than
the relative increase in cost and discuss factors that affect the difference in the
magnitude of emission reduction and cost increase.
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Most studies in the OM literature on carbon emission are based on determin-
istic demand models. We have found one study that deals with carbon emission
restrictions under stochastic demand.
Song and Leng [48] analyze the single-period newsvendor problem under three
carbon emission restriction policies: carbon cap, carbon tax and cap-and-trade.
They also suggest that the technology investment in the carbon offset is a spe-
cial case of the cap-and-trade policy. Under each policy, they derive analytical
solutions for optimal production quantity and evaluate corresponding expected
profit. They provide managerial insights on their analytical results.
2.4 Synthesis of Literature Review
In this thesis, we study the newsvendor problem in a production setting with
multiple inputs incorporating production functions in power forms. As such,
our model subsumes that in [48], but provides richer and more general results.
In addition, we consider two carbon emission restriction policies: carbon cap in
Problem 1 and cap-and-trade in Problem 2. We determine the optimal production
policy in Problem 1 and optimal carbon permit contract policy in Problem 2 so
as to maximize the expected profit.
In Problem 1, we study the production of a single item in the newsvendor
setting with multiple inputs under a carbon cap. We extend the model in [48]
and consider the inputs that contribute to the production process via production
functions. The production cost is included when calculating the expected profit.
We aim to find the optimal production policy given by the production quantity
and the input allocation. In order to find the production policy, we use a similar
approach as in the studies [12], [15], [3]. In these papers, they find the optimal
production quantities for each product for a given resource level. Then, they use
this information in determining the optimal resource level. In our study, we first
determine the optimal allocation of resources for a given production quantity
and carbon cap. Then we find the optimal production quantity based on this
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information.
In Problem 2, we consider an emission trading scheme where an advance
permit purchase is made at an initial price. After the demand and carbon market
prices are revealed, the producer may buy additional permit or sell some of the
permit at hand in order to satify the demand. Therefore, the revelation of the
demand and carbon market prices divide the problem into two stages or two
periods. In the first period, we determine the optimal carbon trade policy as well
as the optimal allocation of resources for a given initial carbon permit under the
realized demand and carbon market prices. Then we use the information in order
to develop an advance permit purchase policy under random demand and carbon
market prices so as to maximize the expected profit.
For Problem 2, we also use the same solution approach as explained for Prob-
lem 1 above in order to determine the carbon trade policy after the demand is
realized. In this case, we first find the optimal allocation of resources for a given
demand and carbon emission level, as in Problem 1. Then we decide on how much
permit to buy or sell so as to reach the emission level that maximizes the profit.
Note that in Problem 1, the carbon emission level is restricted by the carbon
cap and we change the production quantity whereas in Problem 2, we change the
carbon emission level and the production quantity is fixed by the demand.
Even though the studies [4] and [46] consider random demand, they assume
deterministic prices for the future capacity purchase when deciding the capacity
contract. In [4], these are given by the exercise prices of the options whereas in
[46], these are given by the spot market prices and the contract prices with the
supplier. In Problem 2, we assume stochasticity for the future capacity purchase,
carbon market prices in this case, as well and consider that initial carbon permit
purchase is made prior to the revelation of these carbon market prices.
The works [45], [54] and [49] are more similar to our formulation of Problem
2 due to stochastic future capacity purchase prices. A common solution method
in these studies is to first find the optimal inventory policy under the assumption
of deterministic spot market prices and then to decide on the initial capacity
purchase under this information. We also follow a similar train of thought in our
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solution process. As explained above, we consider the optimal production and
carbon trade policies when the demand and carbon market prices are revealed.
Then we find the amount of carbon permit to purchase prior to this information
so as to maximize the expected profit.
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Chapter 3
Production Functions
Production can be described as the means of transforming inputs into outputs.
It is important to know that a particular output may be produced by alternative
combinations of the inputs. A production function is a mean of defining these
alternatives. In other words, it gives a set of possible relations between the inputs
and outputs at a given technology level.
The production function is at the core of the economic theory of production.
Simply, it applies to the production relations within a process, a firm or a plant.
In that sense, it is a micro concept. Given a process with a single output and
multiple inputs, let Q be the output or production quantity and xi be the input
quantity for resource i = 1, . . . , n. The production function is formally defined as
Q = φ(x1, . . . , xn) (3.1)
where φ( ) gives the form of the production function.
Before we introduce some forms of the production functions, we present two
critical concepts in the theory of production: Elasticity of Scale and Elasticity of
Substitution.
The extent of the affect of changing inputs on the output is given by the
elasticity of scale. Elasticity of scale is the ratio of the proportionate increase in
output to the proportionate increase in inputs. If we assume that all inputs are
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increased by the same percentage dxi/xi = dx/x, ∀i = 1, . . . , n, the elasticity of
scale, ε is defined by the equation:
ε = (dQ/Q)/(dx/x) (3.2)
If ε = 1, then doubling all the inputs will double the output, the case we refer
as constant returns to scale. If ε < 1, we get less than doubling of the output
when we double all the inputs and we have decreasing returns to scale. Finally,
if ε > 1, this case is called increasing returns to scale in which doubling all the
inputs will result more than doubling of the output.
Let us assume a production process with two inputs, x1 and x2, and let the
prices of these inputs be p1 and p2 respectively. The cost of production is Γ =
p1x1 + p2x2. At a constant cost Γ = Γ, all combinations of x1 and x2 are given
by x1 = −(p2/p1)x2 + Γ/p1. This line is called isocost line and its slope is
dx1/dx2 = −p2/p1. The increase in input 1 price, p1, may cause two effect: the
cost of producing the given output may increase or input 2 may be substituted
for input 1. The latter effect is called the substitution effect.
The elasticity of substitution is the ratio of the proportionate change in in-
put proportions to the proportionate change in the slope of the isocost. Input
proportions are x1/x2 and the change in input proportions is d(x1/x2) hence the
proportionate change in input proportions is d(x1/x2)/(x1/x2). The slope of the
isocost is (dx1/dx2) and the change in the slope is d(dx1/dx2), hence the pro-
portionate change of the slope is d
(
dx1
dx2
)
/
(
dx1
dx2
)
. To sum up, the elasticity of
substitution (σ) is
σ =
d
(
x1
x2
)
/
(
x1
x2
)
d
(
dx1
dx2
)
/
(
dx1
dx2
) (3.3)
Now, we introduce two important production functions that are used in the eco-
nomic theory of production: Cobb-Douglas and Leontief.
Cobb-Douglas production function is without a doubt the most widely known
production function. Its form was suggested by the mathematician Cobb based
on Professor Paul Douglas’ observations on the empirical study of capital stock,
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labor force and GNP for the US manufacturing industries for the period 1899-
1922. Even though the suggested form is Q = Axα1x
1−α
2 , it may be generalized to
multiple inputs
Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi (3.4)
where the positive coefficient A is the technology level for the process. Note
that it is necessary to have some of each input in the Cobb-Douglas production
function since it is not possible to produce unless all the inputs are available.
Elasticity of scale of the Cobb-Douglas function depends solely on αi (> 0)’s
which we will call input elasticities. It is given by ε =
∑n
i=1 αi. On the other
hand, the elasticity of substitution is σ = 1 which implies that the inputs are
perfectly substitutable.
Cobb-Douglas model is widely applied to a variety of economic systems at
different levels from a simple process to a country’s economy. Most of the stud-
ies that refer to the Cobb-Douglas production function is empirical studies that
estimates GNP of a country or an industry with capital and labor as inputs. To
illustrate its use in the literature, we present a few of these studies here.
Komiya [27] investigates steam power industry in the US for the period 1938-
1956 under the Cobb-Douglas production function. The inputs are capital, labor
and fuel while the output is the energy generated.
Ozaki [38] examines the developments in Japanese economy from 1955 to
1968. He studies 54 sectors that are categorized in six technology types. For
the sectors that use labor intensive, constant earning type technology, he uses
the Cobb-Douglas production function with production scale as the output, and
labor and capital as the inputs.
Keilbach [23] estimates the value of the marginal product of emission in the
German manufacturing industry based on the period 1966-1990. He uses the
Cobb-Douglas production function in his model where the output is the value
added of the manufacturing industry and the inputs are capital, labor and emis-
sion. He considers the model for four different types of emission: SO2, CO2, NOx
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and particular matter.
Khanna [24] conducts an empirical study on cost of meeting Kyoto Protocol
commitments under technology change. In the model, the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function is used to model real GDP as a function of the capital, labor
and energy inputs. The data is based on the period 1965-1999 for 23 Annex 1
countries.
Shadbegian and Gray [47] uses the Cobb-Douglas production function in their
model to analyze the impact of pollution abatement expenditures on productivity
in paper, steel and oil industries for the period 1979-1990. Their output is the
value of shipment while the inputs are productive capital stock, pollution abate-
ment capital stock, labor for production, labor for pollution abatement, materials
used for production and materials used for pollution abatement.
Hatırlı et al. [18] studies the relationship between energy inputs and crop
yield for greenhouse tomato production in Antalya, Turkey. The output is the
tomato yield while the inputs are fertilizer, chemicals, machinery, labor force,
water for irrigation and seed. They convert the output and the inputs to their
energy equivalents. Then they examine the relationship between inputs and the
output under the Cobb-Douglas production function.
Wei [52] discusses the impact of energy use efficieny and energy production
efficiency on GDP and energy consumption in short and long terms. They assume
the Cobb-Douglas model where the output is GDP and the inputs are labor,
capital and energy /technology.
Yuan et al. [56] estimates the impact of technologic changes on the energy
intensity by assuming a Cobb-Douglas model for the period 1995-2006. The
inputs are capital, labor and energy with exogeneous technology progress while
the output is the value added of the industry.
Kogan and Tapiero [26] considers a supply chain with N -firms. They assume
an aggregate production function where the price is the output, and inputs are the
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labor force and investment policy. The firms select the optimal level of employ-
ment and the level of co-investment in the supply chain infrastucture to maximize
their discounted profit. They use the Cobb-Douglas production function in their
examples.
In this thesis, we consider Problem 1 and 2 under the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. In our formulation, we assume that input elasticities are αi ≤ 1 for
i = 1, . . . , n and we let returns to scale be r =
∑n
i=1 αi. The production quantity,
Q, will be given by Equation 3.4.
Another interesting form of the production functions is the one which focuses
on the interdependence of the stages of production. This approach is based on
the work of Leontief and is called putty-clay, fixed proportions or inter-industry
approach to economic modelling. Leontief focuses on the flows of intermediates
between stages and explains the output for these intermediates in terms of the
production quantity. In this case, there is a fixed proportion of the inputs and
the output decision determines the input quantities. The Leontief production
function is given by the equation
Q = min{Qi} (3.5)
where Qi is the intermediate output for stage i = 1, . . . , n and Qi is given by
some function of the input xi.
In the Leontief production function, the elasticity of substitution is σ = 0
which implies that the inputs are perfect complements and the input costs have
no affect on input quantities.
While we have perfect substitution in Cobb-Douglas, the Leontief models the
production process with perfectly complementing inputs. Even though Leontief is
not as popular as the Cobb-Douglas production function, it is significant since it
gives an alternative approach to production. To illustrate its use in the literature,
we present a few of these studies here.
Komiya [27] examines steam power industry in the US for the period 1938-
1956. He uses the Leontief production function in his model. The inputs are
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capital, labor and fuel while the output is the energy generated. The relationship
between input xi and the output, Y , is given by the following equation, where ai
and bi are some positive constants: Y = aix
bi
i .
Haldi and Whitcomb [16] assume the same functional form for the Leontief
production function in their study of production process in various industries
such as petroleum refining, primary metals and electric power. The output is the
capacity while the inputs are capital, labor, energy and raw materials.
Ozaki [38] studies the developments in Japanese economy from 1955 to 1968.
He analyzes 54 sectors that are categorized in six technology types. For the
sectors that use large quantity processing, large-scale assembly production and
capital intensive technology, he uses the Leontief production function with the
same functional form in [27] and [16]. He assumes production scale as the output,
and labor and capital as the inputs.
Lau and Tamura [32] uses the Leontief production function with a nonho-
mothetic form which presents a more generalized relation between the inputs by
allowing varying returns to scale for the same input. In their empirical study,
they present an application of their model to the Japanese petrochemical pro-
cessing industry for the period 1958-1969. The inputs are capital, labor, energy
in the form of fuel and electricity, and raw material. The output is the amount
of ethylene produced at the end of the process.
Nakamura [37] introduces a nonhomothetic form of the Leontief cost function.
He uses capital, labor and material as the inputs, and applies his model to a
pooled data set of Japanese iron and steel industry for the period 1962-1982.
In this thesis, we also consider Problem 1 and 2 under the Leontief production
function. In our formulation, the production quantity will be given by Equation
3.5 and we assume a relation between the inputs and the intermediate output
which is similar to the input-output relations in [27], [16] and [38]. Thus the
intermediate output for any stage is given by the following
Qi = Aix
αi
i for all i = 1, . . . , n (3.6)
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where Qi is the intermediate output, Ai (> 0) is the technology level, xi is the
input quantity and αi (> 0) is the elasticity of scale for stage i = 1, . . . , n.
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Chapter 4
Problem 1: Production Policy for
a Manufacturer with Multiple
Inputs under a Carbon Cap
In this chapter, we study the production decisions of a manufacturer for a sin-
gle product with multiple inputs and stochastic demand under carbon emission
regulation which imposes a strict emission cap.
In the literature, the classical single period inventory control (newsvendor)
problem refers to the replenishment/production decision for a single item with
random demand. The production quantity is used to satify the demand during the
period and the realized demand determines the profit at the end of that period.
Each unit of the product is sold at a price per unit, s. If there is remaining
inventory at the end of the period, an excess cost per unit, ce, is incurred for
unsold items. If demand exceeds the produced quantity, a shortage cost per
unit of demand, cs, is incurred for the unsatisfied demand. For a nonnegative
continuous random demand, D, with p.d.f. f(.) and c.d.f. F (.), and a production
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quantity, Q, the expected profit, Π˜(Q) is written as
Π˜(Q) =sE[min(Q,D)]− csE[max(0, (D −Q))]− ceE[max(0, (Q−D))]
=s
∫ Q
0
Df(D)dD + s
∫ ∞
Q
Qf(D)dD − cs
∫ ∞
Q
(D −Q)f(D)dD
− ce
∫ Q
0
(Q−D)f(D)dD
The classical newsvendor problem refers to the following optimization problem.
max
Q
Π˜(Q)
s.t. Q ≥ 0
It is a well known fact that the objective function is concave in the production
quantity, Q. The optimal solution to this problem is given by
F (Q∗∗) =
s+ cs
s+ cs + ce
(4.1)
where Q∗∗ denotes the optimal production quantity [35].
The fractile entity on the righthand side of Equation 4.1 is the so-called desired
service level. Note that it is defined through the ’effective’ shortage cost per unit
(s+ cs) and the excess cost per unit, ce.
The optimization problem we consider in this chapter relies on this classical
newsvendor problem contruct. However, it differs from it in a number of aspects:
(i) production consumes multiple inputs (resources)
(ii) usage of each input is non-linear in the quantity produced
(iii) usage of each input results in carbon emission, which is assumed to be
linear in the amount of usage
(iv) there is an externally imposed cap on the total carbon emission during
production.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers all these
aspects. Next, we formally construct our optimization problem.
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We assume a production model with n(≥ 1) inputs. The relationship be-
tween the inputs and the production quantity is given by Q = φ(~x) where
−→x = (x1, . . . , xn). Each input, xi, i = 1, .., n, has a procurement cost per unit, pi,
and carbon emission per unit βi. We assume linear production cost and carbon
emission in our problem. Hence, the production cost is given as follows
Γ(~x) =
n∑
i=1
pixi (4.2)
and the carbon emission is given by
(~x) =
n∑
i=1
βixi (4.3)
Finally, we assume that a carbon cap κ is imposed by the authorities.
Our objective is to determine the production quantity and input values that
will maximize the total expected profit, Π(Q,~x) = Π˜(Q) − Γ(~x), under a pro-
duction function, Q = φ(~x), and carbon cap restriction, (~x) ≤ κ. Therefore, we
consider the below problem which we will address as Problem P1:
max
Q,~x
Π(Q,~x) = Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x) (P1)
s.t. Q = φ(~x)
(~x) ≤ κ
Q ≥ 0
In our analysis in this chapter, we consider different subproblems of Problem P1
in order to gain insight on the problem and develop the solution to the original
optimization problem in steps.
First, we analyze the problem without a carbon emission constraint and label
this problem as Problem P1U .
max
Q,~x
Π(Q,~x) = Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x) (P1U)
s.t. Q = φ(~x)
Q ≥ 0
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In order to solve this problem above, we consider a subproblem for a given Q ≥ 0,
which we label as Problem SP1U and is formally stated as follows.
min
~x
Γ(~x) (SP1U)
s.t. Q = φ(~x)
The solution to Problem SP1U gives us the optimal input allocation for a given
Q ≥ 0, which is ~x∗∗(Q) . In this case, the minimum production cost for a given
Q ≥ 0 is Γ∗∗(Q) = Γ(~x∗∗(Q)). We can substitute ~x∗∗(Q) for ~x in Problem P1U
and reduce the problem to an equivalent problem, Problem P1U∗, with single
varible, Q.
max
Q
Π(Q) = Π˜(Q)− Γ∗∗(Q) (P1U∗)
s.t. Q ≥ 0
Once we solve this problem, we find the optimal production quantity Q∗∗.
Thereby, we can compute the optimal allocation of the inputs ~x∗∗(Q∗∗) for the
original problem, Problem P1U and the corresponding carbon emission level,
1U = (~x
∗∗(Q∗∗)).
So far, we have considered only the unconstrained optimization problem (that
is, in the absence of a carbon emission constraint).
Next, we consider a variant problem which provides the minimum emission
level for a given Q ≥ 0. We call this variant Problem CE1 and state it formally
as follows.
min−→x
(−→x ) (CE1)
s.t. Q = φ(−→x )
The optimal solution to Problem CE1 gives the input allocation that will mini-
mize the emission level for a given Q ≥ 0. The corresponding minimum carbon
cap κmin(Q) is given by the value of the objective function at the optimal solu-
tion, (~x∗∗(Q)) resulting in κmin(Q) = (~x∗∗(Q)). This solution to this problem
enables us to develop feasibility conditions which we later use in the construction
of the optimal solution stucture in the presence of a carbon emission constraint.
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Finally, we study the the original problem Problem P1. We first check if
1U ≤ κ. If this inequality is satisfied, then the optimal solution to Problem
P1 is given by the optimal solution to Problem P1U . Otherwise, we know that
the carbon cap constraint is binding and (~x) = κ. In this case, we introduce a
nonnegative scalar Lagrange multiplier, λ, for the carbon cap constraint and write
the objective function (the Lagrangean) as Π̂(Q,~x) = Π˜(Q)−Γ(~x)−λ ((~x)− κ).
The new equivalent problem, Problem P̂1, is
max
Q,~x
Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x)− λ ((~x)− κ) (P̂1)
s.t. Q = φ(~x)
Q ≥ 0
Note that this problem is similar in structure to Problem P1U . Therefore we
follow the same steps to solve this problem. We first study the allocation of the
inputs in Problem SP1 for a given λ, Q ≥ 0.
min
~x
Γ̂(~x) = Γ(~x) + λ(~x) (SP1)
s.t. Q = φ(~x)
The optimal allocation of the inputs in Problem SP1 is ~x∗∗(λ,Q) for a given
λ,Q ≥ 0. Then we substitute this solution to Problem P̂1 in order to get a new
equivalent problem Problem P1∗ which reduces to a single variable Q for a given
λ. Then we have
max
Q
Π̂(Q) = Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x∗∗(λ,Q))− λ ((~x∗∗(λ,Q))− κ) (P1∗)
s.t. Q ≥ 0
We also enforce (~x∗∗(λ,Q)) = κ in order to ensure that the carbon cap is bind-
ing. We find the optimal production quantity Q∗∗ for Problem P1∗ and the
corresponding λ∗∗ value. Then we can obtain the optimal input allocation for the
original problem, Problem P1.
In the following sections, we analyze Problems SP1U , P1U∗, CE1, SP1 and
P1∗ for two production functions: Cobb-Douglas and Leontief.
30
4.1 The Cobb-Douglas Production Function
Model
In this section, we study Problem 1 under a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Recall that in the Cobb-Douglas production function the production quantity, Q,
is given by
Q = φ(~x) = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
where xi is the input quantity and 0 < αi ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n and the rate of
return is r =
∑n
i=1 αi.
This relationship enables us to eliminate one of the variables by substitu-
tion. We pick arbitrarily a variable, say, xn to express its value in terms of the
production quantity Q and the other inputs xi for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Lemma 4.1. Let x∗n = xn(Q, x1, . . . , xn−1) be a function of production quantity
Q and other inputs xi for i = 1, . . . , n− 1. Then the following relation holds
x∗n =
(
Q
A
∏n−1
j=1 xj
αj
) 1
αn
(4.4)
Proof. Equation 3.4 implies xn
αnA
∏
j 6=n xj
αj = Q. From which we get, xn =(
Q
A
∏
j 6=n xj
αj
) 1
αn
The relationship given by Equation 4.4 is used to eliminate the production
function constraint in the sequel.
Next, we study Problems SP1U and P1U∗ ( where we ignore the carbon cap
constraint) and Problems CE1, SP1 and P1∗ (where we consider the carbon cap)
separately .
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4.1.1 No Carbon Cap is Imposed
We begin our analysis in the absence of a carbon emission constraint. Our objec-
tive is to find the optimal production quantity and input allocation in Problem
P1U under the Cobb-Douglas production function. We call this problem P1Ua,
where ’a’ in the label refers to our usage of the Cobb-Douglas function.
max
Q,~x
Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x) (P1Ua)
s.t. Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
Q ≥ 0
As outlined before, we begin our analysis of production decisions in the pres-
ence of the Cobb-Douglas production function by first studying Problems SP1U
and P1U∗. Their analysis will enable us to solve the optimal production policy
for Problem P1Ua.
We call Problem SP1U under the Cobb-Douglas Production function, Prob-
lem SP1Ua, and state it as follows.
min
~x
Γ(~x) =
n∑
i=1
pixi (SP1Ua)
s.t. Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
First we establish that the objective function Γ(~x) is jointly convex in ~x. In
order to show this, we provide the following general result.
Lemma 4.2. Let G = {gij} be an n× n matrix where
gii = aibi = ai(ai + ci)
gij = aiaj for all i 6= j
Let ∆n be the determinant of G. Then the following relation holds.
∆n = Kn
n∑
i=0
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
where Kn =
∏n
i=1 ai and a0 = 1.
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Proof. Proof by induction. Details are in Appendix A.
Noting that Hessian matrix for the objective function of Problem SP1Ua is
of the same structure as G = {gij} given above, we directly have the following
result.
Lemma 4.3. The objective function Γ(~x) is convex in ~x for a given Q.
Proof. The Hessian matrix of the objective function of Problem SP1Ua is in the
form of G in Lemma 4.2 and has positive definite minors. Details are in Appendix
A.
Having shown the convexity of the objective function, we next, establish the
relationship between the optimal allocations of inputs.
Lemma 4.4. At optimality, for a given production quantity, Q, the input alloca-
tions are as follows.
xi
∗∗(Q)
xj∗∗(Q)
=
αi
pi
pj
αj
for all i, j = 1, . . . , n (4.5)
Proof. Results follow from first order conditions of the objective function in Prob-
lem SP1Ua. See Appendix A for details.
Theorem 4.1. For a given Q,
(i) the unique optimal solution to Problem SP1Ua is
xi
∗∗(Q) =
αi
pi
A−
1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r for all i = 1, .., n (4.6)
(ii) the objective function evaluated at the optimal solution xi
∗∗(Q) is
Γ∗∗(Q) ≡ Γ(~x∗∗(Q)) = rA− 1r
n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r (4.7)
(iii) the emission level at the optimal input allocation for a given Q is
∗∗U1(Q) ≡ (~x∗∗(Q)) =
n∑
i=1
βiαi
pi
n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
(
Q
A
) 1
r
(4.8)
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Proof. Equation 4.6 is derived from Equation 3.4 Lemma 4.4. The unique-
ness and the optimality follow the convexity of the objective function as shown
in 4.3. The objective function value at the optimal solution is evaluated as
Γ(~x∗∗(Q)) =
∑n
j=1 pjxj
∗∗(Q). The emission level at the optimal solution is eval-
uated as (~x∗∗(Q)) =
∑n
j=1 βjxj
∗∗(Q).
Remarks.
1. Equation 4.5 suggests a linear relationship between the production inputs
which is inversely proportional to their respective unit costs and direclty
proportional to their respective elasticities. That is, a resource with a lower
unit cost and a higher elasticity is consumed more.
2. Equation 4.6 provides a closed-form expression for the optimal usage of each
resource for a given production quantity. Note that xj
∗∗(Q) is unique for
any Q.
3. Equation 4.6 suggests all inputs are increasing in Q as expected. When
r ≤ 1, the rate of change is also increasing; otherwise, the rate of change is
also decreasing.
Corollary 4.1. Γ∗∗(Q) given by Equation 4.7 is a convex function of Q for r ≤ 1.
For r > 1, Γ∗∗(Q) is concave in Q.
So far, we have found the optimal input allocation for a given Q and de-
rived the production cost at that allocation. We are ready to find the optimal
production quantity, Q∗∗, that maximizes the overall profit, which is given by
Π(Q) = Π˜(Q)− Γ∗∗(Q) = Π˜(Q)− rA− 1r
n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r (4.9)
Now, we move on to Problem P1U∗a, which is Problem P1U∗ studied under the
Cobb-Douglas production function.
max
Q
Π(Q) = Π˜(Q)− rA− 1r
n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r (P1U∗a)
s.t. Q ≥ 0
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We begin our analysis with some preliminary observations on the objective func-
tion of P1U∗a.
Lemma 4.5. 1. Π(Q) is a continuous function of Q.
2. At Q = 0, Π(Q = 0) = Π˜(Q = 0) = −csE(D).
3. As Q→∞, Π˜(Q)→ sE(D)− ceQ and Π(Q)→ −∞.
4. Π(Q) is a concave function of Q for r ≤ 1; and, for r > 1, if
f(Q) ≥ A
− 1
r
s+ cs + ce
(
1− 1
r
) n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
−2. (4.10)
Proof. The proof of (4) rests on the second order conditions of the objective
function with respect to Q. See Appendix A for details.
We also consider the first derivative of the objective function with respect to
Q in Problem P1U∗a in order to gain some insight on the shape of the objective
function.
Lemma 4.6. The first derivative of the objective function with respect to Q in
Problem P1U∗a is given by
dΠ(Q)
dQ
= (s+ cs)− (s+ cs + ce)F (Q)− A− 1r
n∏
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
r
Q
1
r
−1 (4.11)
1. For r < 1, dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q=0 = s+ cs and dΠ(Q)dQ |Q→∞ → −∞.
2. For r = 1, dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q=0 = s + cs −
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
A
and dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q→∞ → −ce −∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
A
.
3. For r > 1, dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q→0 → −∞ and dΠ(Q)dQ |Q→∞ → −ce.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that the first order condition of the objective function
with respect to Q in Problem P1U∗a exists. Then it is given by
F (Q∗) =
(s+ cs)− A− 1r
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
r
Q∗
1
r
−1
s+ cs + ce
(4.12)
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Remarks. Equation 4.12 implies the following
1. As technology level, A, increases, Q∗ also increases.
2. As purchase price, pi, for any input i increases, Q
∗ decreases.
We have already discussed the concavity of the objective function in Problem
P1U∗a in Lemma 4.5. Now, we look at the quasi-concavity condition of the
objective function in Problem P1U∗a with respect to Q for r > 1.
Corollary 4.3. For r > 1, the objective function of Problem P1U∗a is quasi-
concave in Q∗ under the following condition:
f(Q∗) ≥
(
1− 1
r
)
1
Q∗
(
s+ cs
s+ cs + ce
− F (Q∗)
)
(4.13)
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 4.5 and Corollary 4.2.
Corollary 4.4. 1. Under uniformly distributed demand over the interval [l, u],
Equations 4.12 and 4.10 become
Q∗ +
(u− l)A− 1r ∏ni=1 ( piαi)αir
s+ cs + ce
Q∗
1
r
−1 − u(s+ cs) + lce
s+ cs + ce
= 0
Q2−
1
r ≥ (u− l) A
− 1
r
s+ cs + ce
(
1− 1
r
) n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
2. If demand has a newsvendor distribution with f(Q) = wd′(Q)ewd(Q) where
d′(Q) is the first derivative of d(Q) with respect to Q, Equations 4.12 and
4.10 become
1− e−wd(Q∗) +
A−
1
r
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
r
s+ cs + ce
Q∗
1
r
−1 − s+ cs
s+ cs + ce
= 0
wd′(Q)ewd(Q) ≥ A
− 1
r
s+ cs + ce
(
1− 1
r
) n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
−2
Up to this point, we have gained some insight on the shape of the objective
function and derived the first order optimality condition for Problem P1U∗a.
Now, we combine our results to arrive at the following finding.
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Lemma 4.7. 1. For r < 1, Π(Q) is a concave function with a unique maxi-
mum at Q∗ that solves Equation 4.12.
2. Suppose r = 1. If s + cs >
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
A
, Π(Q) is a concave function with a
unique global maximum at Q∗ that solves Equation 4.12. Otherwise, Π(Q)
is decreasing in Q.
3. For r > 1, Equation 4.12 has at most two solutions.
(a) Suppose Equation 4.12 has no solution. Then Π(Q) is a decreasing
function of Q.
(b) If there exists a unique solution, Q∗, to Equation 4.12, Π(Q) is de-
creasing in Q and has a saddle point at Q∗.
(c) Suppose there exist two solutions to Equation 4.12, Q∗1 and Q
∗
2, where
Q∗1 < Q
∗
2. Then Q
∗
1 is a local minimum and Q
∗
2 is a local maximum of
Π(Q) or both are saddle points.
Proof. 1. For r < 1, Π(Q) is concave in Q as stated in Lemma 4.5. By Lemma
4.6, there exists a Q∗ that solves Equation 4.12 for r < 1. RHS of Equation
4.12 decreases in Q∗ with the intercept (s+cs)
s+cs+ce
which is less than 1 while
LHS is an increasing function of Q∗ and takes values between 0 and 1.
Therefore, they certainly intersect at exactly one point, which yield the
unique solution (See Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Expected Profit as a function of Q, r < 1
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2. For r = 1, Π(Q) is concave in Q as stated in Lemma 4.5. By Lemma 4.6,
dΠ(Q)
dQ
decreases in Q for r = 1. If s + cs >
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
A
, dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q=0 > 0 and
there exists a Q∗ that solves Equation 4.12 for r = 1. RHS of Equation
4.12 is constant and takes the value
(s+cs)−A−1
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
s+cs+ce
which is less than
1 while LHS is an increasing function of Q∗ and takes values between 0 and
1 (See Figure 4.2). Otherwise, Π(Q) is always decreasing in Q (See Figure
4.3).
Figure 4.2: Expected Profit as a function of Q, r = 1 (a)
Figure 4.3: Expected Profit as a function of Q, r = 1 (b)
3. Note that dΠ(Q)
dQ
= s+cs
s+cs+ce
−A
− 1r ∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
r
s+cs+ce
Q
1
r
−1−F (Q). For r > 1, s+cs
s+cs+ce
−
A−
1
r
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
r
s+cs+ce
Q
1
r
−1 is increasing in Q. It goes to −∞ as Q → 0 and
converges to (s+cs)
s+cs+ce
as Q → ∞. F (Q) is increasing in Q and takes values
between 0 and 1. Therefore, they may have no intersection, exactly one or
two intersections depending on the problem parameters.
(a) Suppose there exists no solution to Equation 4.12. Then Π(Q) is al-
ways decreasing in Q because dΠ(Q)
dQ
< 0 (See Figure 4.4).
(b) Suppose there exists a unique solution, Q∗, to Equation 4.12. Q∗
cannot be a local minimum because dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q→∞ → −ce by Lemma 4.6.
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Figure 4.4: Expected Profit as a function of Q, r > 1 (a)
Q∗ cannot be a local maximum because dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q→0 → −∞ by Lemma
4.6. Then the solution is a saddle point (See Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5: Expected Profit as a function of Q, r > 1 (b)
(c) Suppose there exist two solutions Q∗1 and Q
∗
2 where Q
∗
1 < Q
∗
2. Q
∗
1
is either a saddle point or a local minimum because dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q→0 →
−∞ by Lemma 4.6. Q∗2 is either a saddle point or a local maximum
because dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q→∞ → −ce by Lemma 4.6. Then there are two possible
combinations. Either Q∗1 is local minimum and Q
∗
2 is a local maximum
(See Figure 4.6) or both are saddle points (See Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.6: Expected Profit as a function of Q, r > 1 (c1)
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Figure 4.7: Expected Profit as a function of Q, r > 1 (c2)
Theorem 4.2. Let Q∗∗ be the optimal solution to Problem P1Ua.
1. For r < 1, there exists a unique positive optimal solution, Q∗∗ = Q∗ where
Q∗ solves Equation 4.12.
2. For r = 1, there is a unique optimal solution which is
Q∗∗ =
F
−1
(
(s+cs)−A− 1r
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
s+cs+ce
)
if s+ cs ≥
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
A
0 otherwise
(4.14)
3. For r > 1,
(a) If Equation 4.12 has no solution or has a unique solution, then Q∗∗ =
0.
(b) Suppose Equation 4.12 has two solutions: Q∗1 and Q
∗
2, where Q
∗
1 < Q
∗
2.
Then Q∗∗{0, Q∗2}.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 4.7
So far, we have analyzed Problem P1U under the Cobb-Douglas production
function. We have found the production cost minimizing input allocation, x∗∗i (Q)
for a given Q. Then we have found the optimal production quantity Q∗∗ that
maximizes the expected profit. Next, we consider the case where a carbon cap
constraint exists.
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4.1.2 A Carbon Cap is Imposed
We aim to find the optimal production quantity and input allocation in Problem
P1 under the Cobb-Douglas production function when a strict carbon cap is
imposed. We refer to this problem as Problem P1a.
max
Q,~x
Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x) (P1a)
s.t. Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
n∑
i=1
βixi ≤ κ
Q ≥ 0
Theorem 4.3. Let Q∗∗ be the optimal solution to Problem P1Ua. Q∗∗ is the
optimal solution to Problem P1a if the following condition holds:
n∑
i=1
βiαi
pi
n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
(
Q∗∗
A
) 1
r
≤ κ (4.15)
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.1.
If the emission level at the optimal solution of the carbon cap unconstrained
problem satisfies the carbon cap constraint, then we conclude that it is also
optimal for the carbon cap constrained problem. Otherwise, we solve the problem
for the case where the carbon cap constraint is binding,
∑n
i=1 βixi = κ.
Before we begin to work on Problem P1a, we look at a subproblem where we
minimize the emission level at a given production quanitity, Q. It is given by
Problem CE1a:
min
~x
(~x) =
n∑
i=1
βixi (CE1a)
s.t. Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
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Note that this problem has the same structure as Problem SP1Ua. We have a
linear sum of the variables in the objective function and the same Cobb-Douglas
production function constraint. Therefore, we can use the results we have derived
in the previous section.
Lemma 4.8. Let κmin(Q) be the minimum emission level for a given Q under
the Cobb-Douglas production function. Then,
(i) the optimal solution is given by
xi
∗∗(Q) =
αi
βi
A−
1
r
n∏
j=1
(
βj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r for all i = 1, . . . , n (4.16)
(ii) the minimum emission level for a given Q is
κmin(Q) = r
n∏
j=1
(
βj
αj
)αj
r
(
Q
A
) 1
r
(4.17)
Proof. The optimal solution of Problem CE1a follows from Theorem 4.1. Then
the minimum emission level for a given Q is evaluated as κmin(Q) = (~x
∗∗(Q)) =∑n
i=1 βixi
∗∗(Q).
Corollary 4.5. For given carbon cap κ, there exists an upper bound on the pro-
duction quantity, Q ≤ Qmax(κ) where
Qmax(κ) =
Aκr
rr
n∏
j=1
(
αj
βj
)αj
r
(4.18)
Proof. By Lemma 4.8, κmin(Q) is the minimum emission level for a given Q.
Then, production of any Q units is feasible only if κmin(Q) ≤ κ.
This result establishes the feasibility condition for a given constrained prob-
lem. In our numerical study, we use this condition to choose and construct the
experimental set.
Now, we move on to Problem P1a. We rewrite this problem by introducing
a nonnegative scalar Lagrange multiplier, λ, for the carbon cap constraint and
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name the new equivalent problem for a given λ, Problem P̂1a, which is formally
stated as follows
max
Q,~x
Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x)− λ ((~x)− κ) (P̂1a)
s.t. Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
Q ≥ 0
Here, we can interpret λ as the penalty cost of exceeding the carbon emission
cap.
We proceed in our analysis as in the unconstrained case. That is, we first
consider Problems SP1 and P1∗ for the Cobb-Douglas production function in
order to derive the optimal production policy for Problem P̂1a which is the
constrained counterpart of P1a.
We construct Problem SP1 under the Cobb-Douglas production function
called Problem SP1a with the objective function Γ(~x) + λ(~x) - that is, we con-
sider only the terms containing the decision variable vector ~x and ignore the
constant part. Then, Problem SP1a is formally stated as follows.
min
~x
n∑
i=1
(pi + λβi)xi (SP1a)
s.t. Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
Noting that Problem SP1a has a structure similar to Problem SP1Ua, the
result below follows from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.6. For a given Q and λ,
(i) the unique optimal solution to Problem SP1a is
xi
∗∗(Q, λ) =
αi
pi + λβi
A−
1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r for all i = 1, . . . , n (4.19)
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(ii) the objective function evaluated at the optimal solution xi
∗∗(Q, λ) is
Γ∗∗(Q, λ) + λ∗∗(Q, λ) = rA−
1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r (4.20)
Next, we consider Problem P1∗a, which is Problem P1∗ under the Cobb-
Douglas production function. After substituting our findings in Corollary 4.6, for
a given λ, the objective function is given as follows
Π̂(Q) = Π˜(Q) + λκ− rA− 1r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r (4.21)
max
Q
Π̂(Q) = Π˜(Q) + λκ− rA− 1r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r (P1∗a)
s.t. Q ≥ 0
Note that Problem P1∗a differs from Problem P1∗ only in the coefficients of in
front of the term Q
1
r where pj is replaced by the effective cost (pj + λβj) and in
a constant, λ. The analysis below for the constrained case is along the lines for
the unconstrained case.
Corollary 4.7. For a given λ,
1. Π̂(Q) is a continuous function of Q.
2. At Q = 0, Π̂(Q = 0) = −csE(D) + λκ.
3. As Q→∞, Π˜(Q)→ sE(D)− ceQ and Π̂(Q)→ −∞.
4. Π̂(Q) is a concave function of Q for r ≤ 1; and, for r > 1, if
f(Q) ≥ A
− 1
r
s+ cs + ce
(
1− 1
r
) n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
−2. (4.22)
Next, we consider the first derivative of the objective function with respect to
Q in Problem P1∗a in order to gain some insight on the shape of the objective
function.
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Corollary 4.8. For a given λ, the first derivative of the objective function with
respect to Q in Problem P1∗a is given by
dΠ̂(Q)
dQ
= (s+ cs)− (s+ cs + ce)F (Q)−A− 1r
n∏
i=1
(
pi + λβi
αi
)αi
r
Q
1
r
−1 (4.23)
1. For r < 1, dΠ̂(Q)
dQ
|Q=0 = s+ cs and dΠ̂(Q)dQ |Q→∞ → −∞.
2. For r = 1, dΠ̂(Q)
dQ
|Q=0 = s + cs −
∏n
i=1
(
pi+λβi
αi
)αi
A
and dΠ̂(Q)
dQ
|Q→∞ → −ce −∏n
i=1
(
pi+λβi
αi
)αi
A
.
3. For r > 1, dΠ̂(Q)
dQ
|Q→0 → −∞ and dΠ̂(Q)dQ |Q→∞ → −ce.
Corollary 4.9. Suppose that the first order condition of the objective function
with respect to Q in Problem P1∗a exists for a given λ. Then it is given by
F (Q∗) =
(s+ cs)− A− 1r
∏n
i=1
(
pi+λβi
αi
)αi
r
Q∗
1
r
−1
s+ cs + ce
(4.24)
Remarks. For a given λ, Equation 4.24 implies the following
1. As technology level, A, increases, Q∗ also increases.
2. As purchase price, pi, for any input i increases, Q
∗ decreases.
For a given λ, we have already discussed the concavity of the objective function
in Problem P1∗a in Corollary 4.7. Now, we look at the quasi-concavity condition
of the objective function in Problem P1∗a with respect to Q for r > 1 under a
given λ.
Corollary 4.10. Supposer r > 1. Then for a given λ, the objective function of
Problem P1∗a is quasi-concave in Q∗ under the following condition:
f(Q∗) ≥
(
1− 1
r
)
1
Q∗
(
s+ cs
s+ cs + ce
− F (Q∗)
)
(4.25)
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Corollary 4.11. 1. Under uniformly distributed demand over the interval
[l, u], Equations 4.24 and 4.22 become
Q∗ +
(u− l)A− 1r ∏ni=1 (pi+λβiαi )αir
s+ cs + ce
Q∗
1
r
−1 − u(s+ cs) + lce
s+ cs + ce
= 0
Q2−
1
r ≥ (u− l) A
− 1
r
s+ cs + ce
(
1− 1
r
) n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
2. If demand has a newsvendor distribution with f(Q) = wd′(Q)ewd(Q) where
d′(Q) is the first derivative of d(Q) with respect to Q, Equations 4.24 and
4.22 become
1− e−wd(Q∗) +
A−
1
r
∏n
i=1
(
pi+λβi
αi
)αi
r
s+ cs + ce
Q∗
1
r
−1 − s+ cs
s+ cs + ce
= 0
wd′(Q)ewd(Q) ≥ A
− 1
r
s+ cs + ce
(
1− 1
r
) n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
−2
Up to this point, we have gained some insight on the shape of the objective
function and derived the first order optimality condition of Problem P1∗a for a
given λ. Now, we combine our results to arrive at the following finding.
Corollary 4.12. For a given λ,
1. For r < 1, Π̂(Q) is a concave function with a unique maximum at Q∗ that
solves Equation 4.24.
2. Suppose r = 1. If s+ cs >
∏n
i=1
(
pi+λβi
αi
)αi
A
, Π̂(Q) is a concave function with a
unique global maximum at Q∗ that solves Equation 4.24. Otherwise, Π̂(Q)
is decreasing in Q.
3. For r > 1, Equation 4.24 has at most two solutions.
(a) Suppose Equation 4.24 has no solution. Then Π̂(Q) is a decreasing
function of Q.
(b) If there exists a unique solution, Q∗, to Equation 4.24, Π̂(Q) is de-
creasing in Q and has a saddle point at Q∗.
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(c) Suppose there exist two solutions to Equation 4.24, Q∗1 and Q
∗
2, where
Q∗1 < Q
∗
2. Then Q
∗
1 is a local minimum and Q
∗
2 is a local maximum of
Π̂(Q) or both are saddle points.
Note that in this formulation, we assume that the carbon cap constraint is
binding. Therefore, we have another equation that we need to satisfy at the
optimal solution: (~x∗∗) = κ. For a given λ and Q, we have derived the optimal
allocation of inputs given by Equation 4.19. Therefore, the optimal production
quantity Q∗∗ found in Problem P1∗a needs to satisfy this equation as well.
Lemma 4.9. At optimality λ∗∗ solves,
κ =
(
Q∗∗(λ∗∗)
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λ
∗∗βj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + λ∗∗βi
(4.26)
Lemma 4.10. Q∗∗(λ∗∗) is a decreasing and one-to-one function of λ∗∗.
Proof. From Equation 4.26, we get
κA
1
rQ∗∗(λ∗∗)−
1
r =
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λ
∗∗βj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + λ∗∗βi
Then, we have
dQ∗∗(λ∗∗)
dλ∗∗
(
− κA
1
r
rQ∗∗(λ∗∗)
1
r
+1
)
= −
n∏
k=1
(
pk + λ
∗∗βk
αk
)αk
r
(
n∑
i=1
αiβ
2
i
(pi + λ∗∗βi)2
)
+
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + λ∗∗βi
(
n∑
j=1
αj
r
βj
αj
αj
pj + λ∗∗βj
n∏
k=1
(
pk + λ
∗∗βk
αk
)αk
r
)
= r
n∏
k=1
(
pk + λ
∗∗βk
αk
)αk
r
×
( n∑
j=1
βj
pj + λ∗∗βj
αj
r
)2
−
n∑
i=1
(
βi
pi + λ∗∗βi
)2
αi
r

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From which we get,
dQ∗∗(λ∗∗)
dλ∗∗
=− r
2Q∗∗(λ∗∗)
1
r
+1
κA
1
r
n∏
k=1
(
αk
pk + λ∗∗βk
)αk
r
×
( n∑
j=1
βj
pj + λ∗∗βj
αj
r
)2
−
n∑
i=1
(
βi
pi + λ∗∗βi
)2
αi
r

Let Y be a discrete random variable taking values {yi : i = 1, . . . , n}. Note that
E[Y ] =
∑n
i=1 yiPr(Y = yi) and E[Y
2] =
∑n
i=1 y
2
i Pr(Y = yi). Let yi =
βi
pi+λ∗∗βi
and Pr(Y = yi) =
αi
r
. Then
V ar(Y ) = E[Y 2]− E[Y ]2 =
n∑
i=1
(
βi
pi + λ∗∗βi
)2
αi
r
−
(
n∑
j=1
βj
pj + λ∗∗βj
αj
r
)2
Since V ar(Y ) > 0, we have dQ
∗∗(λ∗∗)
dλ∗∗ < 0. Hence Q
∗∗(λ∗∗) is a strictly decreasing,
consequently, one-to-one function of λ∗∗.
We have derived the characteristics of the objective function and its roots in
Problem P1∗a so far. Now, we are ready to propose a solution for the original
problem Problem P1a.
Theorem 4.4. Let Q∗∗ and λ∗∗ give the optimal solution to Problem P1a.
1. For r < 1, there exists a unique positive optimal solution, Q∗∗ = Q∗ where
Q∗ solves Equation 4.24 and λ∗∗ solves Equation 4.26.
2. For r = 1, there is a unique optimal solution. If s+ cs ≥
∏n
i=1
(
pi+λ
∗∗βi
αi
)αi
A
,
Q∗∗ = F−1
(s+ cs)− A− 1r ∏ni=1
(
pi+λ
∗∗βj
αi
)αi
s+ cs + ce

and λ∗∗ solves Equation 4.26. Otherwise Q∗∗ = 0 and λ∗∗ = 0.
3. For r > 1, the optimal solution (Q∗∗, λ∗∗){(0, 0), (Q˜∗∗, λ˜∗∗)} where λ˜∗∗
solves Equation 4.26 and Q˜∗∗ solves Equation 4.24.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 4.12, Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10.
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Theorem 4.4 gives us the optimal production quantity Q∗∗ and corresponding
λ∗∗ value for Problem P1a where the carbon cap is binding. Then, we can
compute the optimal input allocation at (Q∗∗, λ∗∗) from Equation 4.19.
We have derived the optimal production policy for Problem 1 under Cobb-
Douglas production function. Now, we move on to Leontief production function
in the next section.
4.2 The Leontief Production Function Model
In this section, we study the same optimization problem (Problem 1) under the
Leontief production function. Recall that, in our model, the Leontief production
function is assumed to have the following form: Q = min{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
where Ai(> 0) is the input-specific technology level and αi(> 0) is the input
elasticity of input i = 1, . . . , n.
Next, we study Problems SP1U and P1U∗ ( where we ignore the carbon cap
constraint) and analyze Problems CE1, SP1 and P1∗ ( where we consider the
carbon cap) separately.
4.2.1 No Carbon Cap is Imposed
In this section, we look at Problem P1U under the Leontief production function,
which is labeled as Problem P1Ub, and find the optimal production quantity and
input allocation.
max
Q,~x
Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x) (P1Ub)
s.t. Q = min{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
Q ≥ 0
We first consider Problems SP1U and P1U∗ for the Leontief production function
to derive the optimal production policy for Problem P1Ub.
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Problem SP1U under the Leontief Production function, Problem SP1Ub, is
stated as follows.
min
~x
Γ(~x) =
n∑
i=1
pixi (SP1Ub)
s.t. Q = min{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
For this problem, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.5. For a given , Q,
(i) the optimal solution to SP1Ub is given by
xi
∗∗(Q) =
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
for all i = 1, . . . , n (4.27)
(ii) the objective function evaluated at the optimal solution xi
∗∗(Q) is
Γ∗∗(Q) ≡ Γ(~x∗∗(Q)) =
n∑
i=1
pi
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
(4.28)
(iii) the emission level at the optimal input allocation for a given Q is
∗∗U1(Q) ≡ (~x∗∗(Q)) =
n∑
i=1
βi
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
(4.29)
Proof. See Appendix A for the derivation of xi
∗∗(Q). The objective function value
at the optimal solution is evaluated as Γ(~x∗∗(Q)) =
∑n
j=1 pjxj
∗∗(Q). The emission
level at the optimal solution is evaluated as (~x∗∗(Q)) =
∑n
j=1 βjxj
∗∗(Q).
Remarks.
1. Equation 4.27 provides a closed-form expression for the optimal usage of
each resource for a given production quantity. Note that xj
∗∗(Q) is unique
for any Q.
2. Equation 4.27 suggests the optimal quantity of each input i depends only
on the production function parameters, elasticity αi and the technology Ai
of the corresponding input, for any Q.
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3. Equation 4.27 also suggests that all inputs are increasing in Q as expected.
The general conditions on convexity of Γ∗∗(Q) in Q appear to be quite com-
plex; however, we have been able to obtain a sufficient condition for convexity
which we provide below.
Corollary 4.13. Γ∗∗(Q) given by Equation 4.28 is a convex function of Q if
αi ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
We have derived the optimal solution for a given Q and are ready to find the
optimal production quantity, Q∗∗, that maximizes the overall profit. We move on
to Problem P1U∗b, which is Problem P1U∗ studied under the Leontief production
function.
max
Q
Π(Q) = Π˜(Q)−
n∑
i=1
pi
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
(P1U∗b)
s.t. Q ≥ 0
First, we present some preliminary observations on the objective function of
P1U∗b.
Lemma 4.11. 1. Π(Q) is a continuous function of Q.
2. At Q = 0, Π(Q = 0) = Π˜(Q = 0) = −csE(D).
3. As Q→∞, Π˜(Q)→ sE(D)− ceQ and Π(Q)→ −∞.
4. For αi ≤ 1,∀i = 1, . . . , n, Π(Q) is concave in Q. When any αi > 1 for
i = 1, . . . , n, Π(Q) is concave in Q if
f(Q) ≥
∑n
i=1
pi(1− 1αi )
αiAi
1
αi
Q
1
αi
−2
s+ cs + ce
(4.30)
Proof. The details of the derivation in (4) is given in Appendix A.
We also consider the first derivative of the objective function with respect to
Q in Problem P1U∗b in order to gain some insight on the shape of the objective
function.
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Lemma 4.12. The first derivative of the objective function with respect to Q in
Problem P1U∗b is given by
dΠ(Q)
dQ
= s+ cs − (s+ cs + ce)F (Q)−
n∑
i=1
pi
αiAi
1
αi
Q
1
αi
−1
(4.31)
1. For αi ≤ 1,∀i = 1, . . . , n, dΠ(Q)dQ |Q=0 = s+ cs and dΠ(Q)dQ |Q→∞ → −∞.
2. When any αi > 1 for i = 1, . . . , n,
dΠ(Q)
dQ
|Q→0 → −∞ and dΠ(Q)dQ |Q→∞ →
−∞.
Now, we look at the first order optimality conditions for Problem P1U∗b.
Lemma 4.13. Suppose that the first order condition of the objective function
with respect to Q in Problem P1U∗b exists. Then it is given by
F (Q∗) =
(s+ cs)−
∑n
i=1
piQ
∗ 1αi−1
αiAi
1
αi
s+ cs + ce
(4.32)
Proof. Follows from Lemma 4.12.
Remarks. Equation 4.32 implies the following:
1. As technology level, Ai for any input i increases, Q
∗ also increases.
2. As purchase price, pi, for any input i increases, Q
∗ decreases.
Corollary 4.14. 1. Under uniformly distributed demand over the interval
[l, u], Equations 4.32 and 4.30 become
Q∗ +
u− l
s+ cs + ce
n∑
i=1
piQ
∗(1/αi−1)
αiAi
1/αi
− u(s+ cs) + lce
s+ cs + ce
= 0
1 ≥ (u− l)
∑n
i=1
pi(1− 1αi )
αiAi
1
αi
Q
1
αi
−2
s+ cs + ce
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2. If demand has a newsvendor distribution with f(Q) = wd′(Q)ewd(Q) where
d′(Q) is the first derivative of d(Q) with respect to Q,, Equations 4.32 and
4.30 become
1− e−wd(Q∗)Q∗ + 1
s+ cs + ce
n∑
i=1
piQ
∗(1/αi−1)
αiAi
1/αi
− s+ cs
s+ cs + ce
= 0
wd′(Q)ewd(Q) ≥
∑n
i=1
pi(1− 1αi )
αiAi
1
αi
Q
1
αi
−2
s+ cs + ce
Theorem 4.6. Let Q∗∗ be the optimal solution to Problem P1Ub.
1. For αi ≤ 1,∀i = 1, . . . , n, there exists a unique positive optimal solution,
Q∗∗ = Q∗ where Q∗ solves Equation 4.32.
2. Suppose ∃αi > 1, i = 1, . . . , n. Let ~Q∗ be the set of solutions that satisfy
Equations 4.32 and 4.30. Then the unique optimal solution Q∗∗{0, ~Q∗}.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13.
Remarks. For any αi > 1, i = 1, . . . , n case, we cannot guarantee that the
largest Q∗ that solves Equation 4.32 is the optimal. Hence we need to check each
and every extremum for optimality.
We have analyzed Problem P1U under Leontief production function. We
have found the input allocation that minimizes the production cost for a given Q,
x∗∗i (Q) . Then we have found the optimal production quantity Q
∗∗ that maximizes
the expected profit. Next, we consider the problem with carbon cap constraint.
4.2.2 A Carbon Cap is Imposed
Our objective is to find the optimal production quantity and input allocation in
Problem P1 under Leontief production function. We refer to this problem as
53
Problem P1b.
max
Q,~x
Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x) (P1b)
s.t. Q = min{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi , ∀i}
n∑
i=1
βixi ≤ κ
Q ≥ 0
Theorem 4.7. Let Q∗∗ be the optimal solution to Problem P1Ub. Q∗∗ is the
optimal solution Problem P1b if the following condition holds:
n∑
i=1
βi
(
Q∗∗
Ai
) 1
αi ≤ κ (4.33)
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.5.
If the emission level at the optimal solution of the carbon cap unconstrained
problem satisfies the carbon cap constraint, then the optimal for the carbon
cap constrained problem is the same as carbon cap unconstrained problem.
Otherwise, we need to solve the problem with binding carbon cap constraint,∑n
i=1 βixi = κ.
Before moving on with Problem P1b, we consider a subproblem where we
minimize the emission level at a given production quanitity, Q. It is given by
Problem CE1b:
min
~x
(~x) =
n∑
i=1
βixi (CE1b)
s.t. Q = min
i
{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
We can observe that this problem has the same structure as Problem SP1Ub
with a linear sum of the variables in the objective function and the same Leontief
production function constraint. Therefore, we can use the results we have derived
in the previous section.
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Lemma 4.14. For Problem CE1b,
(i) the optimal solution for a given Q is
xi
∗∗(Q) =
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
for all i = 1, .., n (4.34)
(ii) the minimum emission level for a given Q is
κmin(Q) ≡ (~x∗∗(Q)) =
n∑
i=1
βi
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
(4.35)
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.5.
Now, we continue working on Problem P1b. We can rewrite this problem
by introducing a nonnegative scalar Lagrange multiplier, λ, for the carbon cap
constraint and name the new equivalent problem for a given λ, Problem P̂1b, is
max
Q,~x
Π˜(Q)− Γ(~x)− λ ((~x)− κ) (P̂1b)
s.t. Q = min
i
{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
Q ≥ 0
Here, λ can be interpreted as a penalty cost of exceeding carbon emission. We
first study Problems SP1 and P1∗ for Leontief production function in order to
derive the optimal production policy for Problem P̂1b which is equivalent to P1b.
Problem SP1 under Leontief Production function, Problem SP1b, is
min
~x
Γ(~x) + λ(~x) =
n∑
i=1
(pi + λβi)xi (SP1a)
s.t. Q = min
i
{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi , ∀i}
Lemma 4.15. For a given Q and λ, the optimal solution to Problem SP1b is
xi
∗∗(Q) = xi∗∗(Q, λ) =
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
for all i = 1, .., n (4.36)
Proof. Problem SP1b has similar structure to Problem SP1Ub. The results follow
from Theorem 4.5.
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Remarks. Equation 4.36 that the optimal input allocation for Problem SP1b
only depends on Q. It implies that optimal allocation of the inputs is not affected
by the value that we give to the carbon constraint.
Next, we consider Problem P1∗b, which is Problem P1∗ under Leontief pro-
duction function. We substitute our findings in Lemma 4.15 and for a given λ,
we have
max
Q
Π̂(Q) = Π˜(Q) + λκ−
n∑
i=1
(pi + λβi)
(
Q
Ai
) 1
αi
(P1∗b)
s.t. Q ≥ 0
In this formulation, we assume that the carbon cap constraint is binding. There-
fore, we have another equation that we need to satisfy at the optimal solution:
(~x∗∗) = κ. For a given λ and Q, we have derived the optimal allocation of in-
puts in Equation 4.36. We also observed that the optimal allocation of inputs
depends only on Q. Therefore, we can find the optimal production quantity Q∗∗
for Problem P1∗b from the equality given by the carbon cap constraint. Note
this solution is also the optimal solution to Problem P1b.
Theorem 4.8. Let Q∗∗ be the optimal production quantity for Problem P1b. Q∗∗
solves
κ =
n∑
i=1
βi
(
Q∗∗
Ai
) 1
αi
(4.37)
Proof. The righthand side of the equation is always increasing in Q. Therefore,
there exists a unique solution Q∗∗ for any carbon cap κ.
Theorem 4.8 gives us the optimal production quantity Q∗∗ for Problem P1a
where the carbon cap is binding. Then we can compute the optimal input allo-
cation at Q∗∗ from Equation 4.36.
Finally, we consider the value of λ∗∗ at the optimal solution.
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Corollary 4.15. At optimality, λ∗∗ solves
λ∗∗ =
(s+ cs)− (s+ cs + ce)F (Q∗∗)−
∑n
i=1
pi
αiAi
1
αi
Q∗∗
1
αi
−1
∑n
i=1
βi
αiAi
1
αi
Q∗∗
1
αi
−1
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Chapter 5
Problem 2: Carbon Permit
Contract Design for a
Manufacturer with Multiple
Inputs
In this chapter, we study the production of a single item with multiple inputs
and stochastic demand under an emission permit trading scheme.
In our problem, we analyze a series of decisions on the timeline (Fig. 5.1).
The first decision is advance carbon permit purchase, κ, at price c per unit carbon
emitted. At this decision epoch, which we call as Period 1, the demand, D, is
not revealed but has a known distribution with p.d.f. f(.) and c.d.f. F (.). In
addition, the future carbon market prices, pb (carbon permit purchase price) and
ps (carbon permit selling price), remain unknown, but have a joint distribution
with p.d.f g(., .) and c.d.f. G(., .), which may be dependent on demand.
After the initial carbon permit purchase, we move on to the second decision
epoch which we call Period 2. At this epoch, the demand and the carbon market
prices are revealed. We assume that the demand needs to be fully satisfied. We
also assume that the carbon permit is bought at price pb and sold at ps, and
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that pb ≥ ps in order to prevent arbitrage. Under the revealed information, we
decide on the allocation of the inputs, ~x where ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), and carbon
trade policy, (qb, qs) where qb is the carbon permit bought at price pb and qs is
the carbon permit sold at price ps, in order to produce the given demand. Note
that, by construct qbqs = 0.
Figure 5.1: Decision timeline for Problem 2
The output of the production process, D, is given by a production function
in the form D = φ(~x). Each input, xi, i = 1, .., n, has a procurement cost per
unit, pi, and carbon emission per unit βi. We assume linear production cost and
carbon emission in our problem. Hence, the production cost is
Γ(~x) =
n∑
i=1
pixi (5.1)
and the carbon emission is
(~x) =
n∑
i=1
βixi (5.2)
Our objective is to find the initial carbon permit, carbon permit trade policy
and allocation of the inputs that will maximize the total expected profit. We solve
this problem with a backward two-period dynamic programming formulation.
That is, we begin with Period 2 and obtain the optimal carbon trade policy
given an initial carbon permit amount κ. Then we consider Period 1 in which we
optimize over κ. Next, we discuss each of these steps in detail.
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In Period 2, we decide on the allocation of the inputs ~x and carbon trade policy
(qb, qs) that will maximize the profit in Period 2 under a production function,
D = φ(~x), and carbon emission constraint, (~x) = κ+ qb − qs. For a given initial
carbon permit κ, we let
Π(qb, qs) = sD + psqs − pbqb (5.3)
Then the Period 2 problem, Problem P2.2, becomes
max
(qb,qs),~x
Π2((qb, qs), ~x|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− Γ(~x) (P2.2)
s.t. D = φ(~x)
(~x) = κ+ qb − qs
qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
We introduce a nonnegative scalar Lagrange multiplier, λ, for the carbon emission
constraint and write the objective function as such Π̂((qb, qs), ~x|κ) = Π(qb, qs) −
Γ(~x)− λ ((~x)− (κ+ qb − qs)) in order to remove the carbon emission constraint
from the problem. Then the new equivalent problem, Problem P̂2.2, is
max
(qb,qs),~x
Π̂((qb, qs), ~x|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− Γ(~x)− λ ((~x)− (κ+ qb − qs)) (P̂2.2)
s.t. D = φ(~x)
qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
First, we study the optimal allocation of the inputs for a given λ and qb, qs ≥ 0.
We call this Problem SP2.
min
~x
Γ̂(~x) = Γ(~x) + λ(~x) (SP2)
s.t. D = φ(~x)
We denote the optimal allocation of the inputs in Problem SP2 for a given λ
and qb, qs ≥ 0 by ~x∗∗(λ, qb, qs). Then, we substitute this solution to Problem P̂2.2
in order to get a new equivalent problem Problem P2.2∗ which reduces to two
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variables qb and qs for a given λ and implicitly, D, pb and ps. Then we have
max
(qb,qs)
Π̂((qb, qs)|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− Γ(~x∗∗(λ, qb, qs)) (P2.2∗)
− λ ((~x∗∗(λ, qb, qs))− (κ+ qb − qs))
s.t. qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
We also enforce (~x∗∗(λ, qb, qs)) − (κ + qb − qs) = 0 in order to ensure that the
carbon emission constraint is binding. We find the optimal carbon trade policy
(q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s ) for Problem P1
∗ and the corresponding λ∗∗ value. Then we can derive
the production policy and carbon permit trade policy for the original problem,
Problem P2.2, and evaluate the value of the objective function for a given κ,
at the optimal solution Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ). This concludes the decision making
process at the beginning of Period 2.
Next, we move on to Period 1. Here, our objective is to determine the initial
carbon permit, κ, that will maximize the total expected profit computed for the
entire problem horizon, which is given as follows
Π1(κ) = −cκ+ ED,pb,ps (Π2((q∗∗b , q∗∗s ), ~x∗∗|κ)) (5.4)
. Therefore we consider the problem below which we will address as Problem
P2.1.
max
κ
Π1(κ) (P2.1)
s.t. κ ≥ 0
Note that Π((q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ) gives us the maximum profit for a given κ under one
instance of realized demand, D, and carbon market prices, pb and ps. Therefore,
we take the expectation with respect to these random variables in order to capture
the expected profit in Period 2 for a given κ.
In the following sections, we analyze Problems SP2, P2.2∗ and P2.1 for two
production functions: Cobb-Douglas and Leontief.
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5.1 The Cobb-Douglas Production Function
In this section, we study the Problem 2 under the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. Recall that in Cobb-Douglas Production Function the production quantity,
D, is given by
D = φ(~x) = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
where xi is the input quantity and αi ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n and the rate of return
is r =
∑n
i=1 αi.
Now, we proceed with Problems SP2, P2.2∗ and P2.1. We will analyze
Problems SP2 and P2.2∗ under the heading of Period 2 and analyze Problem
P2.1 under the heading of Period 1.
5.1.1 Period 2
Our objective is to find the optimal carbon trade policy and input allocation in
Problem P2.2 under the Cobb-Douglas production function when demand and
carbon market prices are revealed. We refer to this problem as P2.2a.
max
(qb,qs),~x
Π2((qb, qs), ~x|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− Γ(~x) (P2.2a)
s.t. D = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
(~x) = κ+ qb − qs
qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
We rewrite this problem by introducing a nonnegative scalar Lagrange multiplier,
λ, for the carbon emission constraint and name the new equivalent problem for
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a given λ, Problem P̂2.2a, is
max
(qb,qs),~x
Π̂((qb, qs), ~x|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− Γ(~x)− λ ((~x)− (κ+ qb − qs))
(P̂2.2a)
s.t. D = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
We can interpret λ as a penalty cost of exceeding carbon emission. In our analy-
sis, we first consider Problems SP2 and P2.2∗ for the Cobb-Douglas production
function in order to derive the optimal production policy for Problem P̂2.2a which
is equivalent to P2.2a.
Problem SP2 under the Cobb-Douglas Production function, Problem SP2a,
is
min
~x
Γ̂(~x) = Γ(~x) + λ(~x) (SP2a)
s.t. D = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
Lemma 5.1. For a given λ and qb, qs ≥ 0 under demand D, the optimal solution
to Problem SP2a is
xi
∗∗(λ, qb, qs, D) =
αi
pi + λβi
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
(
D
A
) 1
r
for all i = 1, . . . , n
(5.5)
Proof. Problem SP2a has similar structure to Problem SP1Ua. The results
follow from Theorem 4.1.
Now, we move on to Problem P2.2∗a, which is Problem P2.2∗ under Cobb-
Douglas production function. After substituting our findings in Lemma 5.1, for
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a given λ, we have
max
(qb,qs)
Π̂((qb, qs)|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− λ(κ+ qb − qs)− rA− 1r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
(P2.2∗a)
s.t. qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
Note that in this formulation, we assume that the carbon emission constraint
is binding. Therefore, we have another equation that we need to satisfy at the
optimal solution: (~x∗∗(λ, qb, qs)) = κ + qb − qs. For a given λ and qb, qs ≥ 0, we
have derived the optimal allocation of inputs given by Equation 5.5. Therefore,
the carbon trade policy (q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s ) found in Problem P2.2
∗a needs to satisfy this
equation as well.
Corollary 5.1. For a given λ under demand D, (q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s ) solves
κ+ q∗∗b − q∗∗s =
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + λβi
(5.6)
Now, we make some preliminary observations that we will be useful for deriv-
ing the optimal policy later on.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose the relation between Λ and  is given as follows
 =
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + Λβj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + Λβi
(5.7)
for Λ, D,A ≥ 0, αi, pi, βi > 0,∀i = 1, . . . , n and
∑
i αi = r. Then,  is a
decreasing and one-to-one function of Λ.
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Proof.
d
dΛ
=
(
D
A
) 1
r
{
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + Λβi
(
n∑
j=1
αj
r
βj
αj
αj
pj + Λβj
n∏
k=1
(
pk + Λβk
αk
)αk
r
)
−
n∏
k=1
(
pk + Λβk
αk
)αk
r
(
n∑
i=1
αiβ
2
i
(pi + Λβi)2
)
}
=r
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
k=1
(
pk + Λβk
αk
)αk
r
×
( n∑
j=1
βj
pj + Λβj
αj
r
)2
−
n∑
i=1
(
βi
pi + Λβi
)2
αi
r

Let Y be a discrete random variable taking values {yi : i = 1, . . . , n}. Note that
E[Y ] =
∑n
i=1 yiPr(Y = yi) and E[Y
2] =
∑n
i=1 y
2
i Pr(Y = yi). Let yi =
βi
pi+Λ()βi
and Pr(Y = yi) =
αi
r
. Then
V ar(Y ) = E[Y 2]− E[Y ]2 =
n∑
i=1
(
βi
pi + Λβi
)2
αi
r
−
(
n∑
j=1
βj
pj + Λβj
αj
r
)2
Since V ar(Y ) > 0, we have d
dΛ
< 0. Hence  is a strictly decreasing, and conse-
quently, one-to-one function of Λ.
Definition 5.1. Given pb, ps and D, let κup(D, pb, ps) and κdown(D, pb, ps) be given
by
κup(D, pb, ps) =
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pbβj + pj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + pbβi
(5.8)
κdown(D, pb, ps) =
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
psβj + pj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + psβi
(5.9)
For brevity, we suppress the arguments of the above defined carbon emission
thresholds and use κup and κdown to refer to them.
Corollary 5.2. κup < κdown
Proof. Note that, pb > ps by assumption. Then, by Lemma 5.2, the result follows
as we replace Λ by pb and ps.
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Corollary 5.3. Let κmin be minimum carbon emission required to produce D.
Then, κmin < κup for any given pb, ps and D.
Proof. κmin ≡ κmin(D) = r
∏n
j=1
(
βj
αj
)αj
r (D
A
) 1
r by Lemma 4.8. In Equation 5.7,
as → κmin, Λ()→∞. Since pb <∞, the result follows.
Now, we are ready to derive the optimal solution to Problem P2.2∗a. First, we
consider the first derivatives of the objective function with respect to the decision
variables qb and qs.
Lemma 5.3. For a given λ under carbon market prices pb and ps,
dΠ̂((qb, qs)|κ)
dqb
= λ− pb (5.10)
dΠ̂((qb, qs)|κ)
dqs
= ps − λ (5.11)
Next, we observe the optimal policies for Problem P2.2∗a in three scenarios:
(i) κ ≤ κup, (ii) κup ≤ κ ≤ κdown and (iii) κ ≥ κdown. As noted above, qb and qs
do not take positive values at the same time since we assume pb > ps. Therefore,
we look for the optimal solution in the following regions: R1 : {qb = 0} and
R2 : {qs = 0}. In R1, we are not allowed to buy anymore carbon permit and we
maximize the profit with respect to the single variable qs. In R2, we maximize the
profit with respect to the single variable qb under the condition that we do not
sell any permit. After we find the optimal solutions in both regions, we compare
them to find the the optimal solution for that scenario.
Lemma 5.4. Given demand D and carbon market prices pb and ps, Π̂((qb, qs)|κ)
attains its optimum as follows
1. For κ < κup and qb = 0, q
∗
s = 0.
2. For κ < κup and qs = 0, q
∗
b = κup − κ.
3. For κup ≤ κ ≤ κdown and qb = 0, q∗s = 0.
4. For κup ≤ κ ≤ κdown and qs = 0, q∗b = 0.
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5. For κ > κdown and qb = 0, q
∗
s = κ− κdown.
6. For κ > κdown and qs = 0, q
∗
b = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Next, we derive the optimal policies for each scenario for Problem P2.2∗a.
Corollary 5.4. The optimal policy for Problem P2.2∗a is given by
1. For κ < κup, (q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ) = (κup − κ, 0).
2. For κup ≤ κ ≤ κdown, (q∗∗b , q∗∗s ) = (0, 0).
3. For κdown < κ, (q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ) = (0, κ− κdown).
Proof. 1. By Lemma 5.4, (q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s )  {(0, 0), (κup − κ, 0)} and qb = κup − κ
yields higher profit when qs = 0. Thus, Π̂((0, 0)|κ) ≥ Π̂((κup − κ, 0)|κ).
2. Result immediately follows from Lemma 5.4.
3. By Lemma 5.4, (q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s )  {(0, 0), (0, κ− κdown)} and qs = κ− κdown yields
higher profit when qb = 0. Thus, Π̂((0, 0)|κ) ≥ Π̂((0, κ− κdown)|κ).
Regarding the λ values for the carbon emission constraint, we have the fol-
lowing result.
Corollary 5.5. The optimal λ∗∗ values for the carbon emission constraints are
given by
1. For κ < κup, λ
∗∗ = pb.
2. For κup ≤ κ ≤ κdown, λ∗∗ = λ ≡ λ(D, κ) where λ is defined as
κ =
(
D
A
)1/r n∏
j=1
(
λβj + pj
αj
)αj/r n∑
i=1
αi
λ+ pi
βi
(5.12)
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3. For κdown < κ, λ
∗∗ = ps.
Proof. Suppose κ < κup. By Corollary 5.4, (q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ) = (κup − κ, 0). Given this
solution, λ∗∗ that solves the equation in Corollary 5.1 is equal to pb by Definition
5.1.
The other results similarly follow from Corollaries 5.4 and 5.1, and Definition
5.1.
So far, we have considered Problem P̂2.2a in two subproblems: Problem SP2a
and Problem P2.2∗a. In Problem SP2a, we have found the optimal input allo-
cation for a given carbon trade policy. Then, we have substituted our findings
in the objective function of P̂2.2a and obtained Problem P2.2∗a. Thus, the op-
timal carbon trade policy that we have derived in Problem P2.2∗a gives us the
optimal solution to Problem P̂2.2a. As we have stated above, Problem P̂2.2a is
equivalent to Problem P2.2a.
Now, we are ready to propose the optimal solution to Problem P2.2a.
Theorem 5.1. Under demand D and carbon market prices pb and ps, the optimal
solution to Problem P2.2a is
(qb
∗∗, qs∗∗) =

(κup − κ, 0) , ifκ < κup
(0, 0) , ifκup ≤ κ ≤ κdown
(0, κ− κdown) , ifκ > κdown
(5.13)
xi
∗∗ =
αi
λ∗∗βi + pi
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
λ∗∗βj + pj
αj
)αj
r
(5.14)
where
λ∗∗ =

pb , ifκ < κup
λ , ifκup ≤ κ ≤ κdown
ps , ifκ > κdown
(5.15)
and λ is defined as in Corollary 5.5
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Proof. The optimal carbon trade policy for Problem P2.2∗a is stated in Corollary
5.4. The optimal allocation of the inputs for Problem SP2a follows from Lemma
5.1. The Lagrange multiplier value of the carbon emission constraint for Problem
P2.2∗a is given in Corollary 5.5. As stated above, these problems are the sub-
problems of Problem P̂2.2a, Problem P2.2∗a and Problem SP2a, and Problem
P̂2.2a is equivalent to Problem P2.2a.
Finally, we look at the emission levels and profit at the optimal solution.
Corollary 5.6. Let ∗∗ ≡ κ+q∗∗b −q∗∗s be the emission level at the optimal solution
for Problem P2.2a. Then
∗∗ =

κup : ifκ < κup
κ : ifκup ≤ κ ≤ κdown
κdown : ifκ > κdown
(5.16)
Corollary 5.7. The value of the objective function in Problem P2.2a at the
optimal solution is
Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ) = sD + λ∗∗κ− r
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
λ∗∗βj + pj
αj
)αj
r
(5.17)
where λ∗∗ solves Equation 5.15.
So far, we have derived the optimal solution in Period 2 under the Cobb-
Douglas production function and evaluated the corresponding profit for a revela-
tion of demand and market prices. Now, we move on to Period 1 where we decide
on the initial carbon permit purchase.
5.1.2 Period 1
Our aim in the Period 1 is to determine the initial carbon permit purchase, κ,
that will maximize the total expected profit. Therefore, we look at Problem P2.1
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under the Cobb-Douglas production function, which we call Problem P2.1a.
max
κ
Π1(κ) = −cκ+ ED,pb,ps (Π2((q∗∗b , q∗∗s ), ~x∗∗|κ)) (P2.1a)
s.t. κ ≥ 0
Even if the Cobb-Douglas production function is not shown explicitly in the
formulation, it is considered in the Period 2 Problem and is in Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ)
implicitly. First, we will derive the first order conditions with respect to κ. Then
we will look at concavity of the objective function in κ.
Before we move on with the problem, we define some functions that will help
us in deriving the solution.
Corollary 5.8. Define e(γ, κ) be a function of γ and κ such that
e(γ, κ) = Aκr
∏n
j=1
(
αj
γβj+pj
)αj(∑n
i=1
αiβi
pi+γβi
)r (5.18)
for γ, κ, A > 0, αi, pi, βi > 0,∀i = 1, . . . , n and
∑
i αi = r. Given a demand D
and carbon market prices pb and ps, the following relations hold for a given κ
1. D > e(pb, κ) for κ < κup.
2. D < e(ps, κ) for κ > κdown.
Proof. Let κ < κup. Recall that κup is a function of D (as well as pb and ps); hence,
for clarity, we now explicitly show the argument, κup(D). Then, by Definition
5.1,
κ < κup(D) =
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + pbβj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + pbβi
From which we get,
D > Aκr
∏n
j=1
(
αj
pj+pbβj
)αj(∑n
i=1
αiβi
pi+pbβi
)r = e(pb, κ)
The other result follows similarly.
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e(pb, κ) and e(ps, κ) denote the upper and lower limits respectively on the
demand level in Period 2 within which the entire carbon permit (κ) is used for
production (without any purchase or sale of permit). Hence, λ(D, κ), which has
been defined above in Corollary 5.5, corresponds to the effective shadow price of
carbon permit for a given demand level D which lies between e(pb, κ) and e(ps, κ).
Lemma 5.5. For a given κ, λ(D, κ) = pb when D = e(pb, κ) and λ(D, κ) = ps
when D = e(ps, κ).
Proof. Let D = e(pb, κ). Then, by Corollary 5.8, κ = κup. By Corollary 5.5,
κup = κ =
(
e(pb, κ)
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λ(e(pb, κ), κ)βj
αj
)αj
r n∑
i=1
αi
pi + λ(e(pb, κ), κ)βi
Then, λ(e(pb, κ), κ) = pb by Definition 5.1.
In the above Lemma, we have established that the shadow price of carbon
permit for a given κ, the upper and lower demand limits (e(pb, κ) and e(ps, κ))
is corresponding purchase or selling price of carbon permits in the market. Now,
we can derive the first order optimality conditions and comment on the shape of
the objective function in Problem P2.1a.
Lemma 5.6. The first order condition of the objective function in Problem P2.1a
with respect to κ gives
∫
pb,ps
(
psF (e(ps, κ
∗)) + pbF (e(pb, κ∗)) +
∫ e(pb,κ∗)
e(ps,κ∗)
λ(D,κ∗)f(D)dD
)
g(pb, ps)dpbps = c
(5.19)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 5.7. The objective function of Problem P2.1a is concave in κ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 5.2. The unique optimal solution to Problem P2.1a, κ∗∗ = κ∗ where
κ∗ solves Equation 5.6
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Proof. Follows from Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7.
We have found the optimal production and carbon trade policy for Problem 2
under the Cobb-Douglas production function. In the next section, we will study
the problem under Leontief production function.
5.2 The Leontief Production Function Model
In this section, we study Problem 2 under the Leontief production function. In our
model, recall that we assume that Leontief production function has the following
form: D = min{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i} where Ai is the technology level and αi is
the input elasticity of input i = 1, . . . , n.
Now, we study Problems SP2, P2.2∗ and P2.1. We will analyze Problems
SP2 and P2.2∗ under the heading of Period 2 and analyze Problem P2.1 under
the heading of Period 1.
5.2.1 Period 2
We aim to find the optimal carbon trade policy and input allocation in Problem
P2.2 under the Leontief production function when demand and carbon market
prices are revealed. We refer to this problem as P2.2b.
max
(qb,qs),~x
Π2((qb, qs), ~x|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− Γ(~x) (P2.2b)
s.t. D = min{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
(~x) = κ+ qb − qs
qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
We rewrite this problem by introducing a nonnegative scalar Lagrange multiplier,
λ, for the carbon emission constraint and construct the new equivalent problem
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for a given λ, called Problem P̂2.2b, as follows.
max
(qb,qs),~x
Π̂((qb, qs), ~x|κ) = Π(qb, qs)− Γ(~x)− λ ((~x)− (κ+ qb − qs))
(P̂2.2b)
s.t. D = min
i
{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
qb ≥ 0
0 ≤ qs ≤ κ
Here again, we can interpret λ as a penalty cost of exceeding carbon emission.
Next, we consider Problems SP2 and P2.2∗ for the Leontief production function
in order to derive the optimal production policy for Problem P̂2.2b which is
equivalent to P2.2b.
Problem SP2 under the Leontief Production function referred to as Problem
SP2b is stated as follows
min
~x
Γ̂(~x) = Γ(~x) + λ(~x) (SP2b)
s.t. D = min{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi , ∀i}
Lemma 5.8. For a given λ, qb, qs under demand D, the optimal solution to
Problem SP1b is
xi
∗∗(D) =
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi
for all i = 1, .., n (5.20)
Proof. Problem SP2b has similar structure to Problem SP1Ub. The result follows
from Theorem 4.5.
Note that we assume that the carbon emission constraint is binding in the
formulation of Problem P̂2.2b. Therefore, we have another equation that we
need to satisfy at the optimal solution: (~x∗∗(D)) = κ+qb−qs. For a given λ and
qb, qs ≥ 0, we have derived the optimal allocation of inputs given by Equation
5.20. Therefore, the carbon trade policy (q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s ) found in Problem P2.2
∗b needs
to satisfy this equation as well.
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Lemma 5.9. For a given λ under demand D, (q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s ) solves
κ+ q∗∗b − q∗∗s =
n∑
i=1
βi
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi
(5.21)
Lemma 5.9 suggests that optimal carbon trade policy, (q∗∗b , q
∗∗
s ) in Problem
P̂2.2b, only depends on the realized demand and is independent of carbon market
prices. Also note that qb and qs do not take positive values at the same time since
pb > ps. Therefore, we can directly incur the optimal policy for Problem P2.2b
from this relation.
Theorem 5.3. For a given κ under demand D and carbon market prices pb and
ps, the optimal solution to Problem P2.2b is
(qb
∗∗, qs∗∗) =
( n∑
i=1
βi
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi − κ
)+
,
(
κ−
n∑
i=1
βi
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi
)+ (5.22)
xi
∗∗ =
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi
for all i = 1, .., n (5.23)
λ∗∗  < (5.24)
Proof. The optimal solution to Problem SP2b is given in Lemma 5.8. Since it
is a subproblem of Problem P̂2.2b for a given λ, qb and qs, it gives the optimal
allocation of inputs for Problem P̂2.2b as well. Since Problem P̂2.2b is equivalent
to Problem P2.2b, the result holds for Problem P2.2b as well. The optimal carbon
trade policy follows from Lemma 5.9.
Finally, we look at the emission levels and profit at the optimal solution.
Corollary 5.9. Let ∗∗ ≡ ∗∗(D) = κ + q∗∗b − q∗∗s be the emission level under
demand D at the optimal solution for Problem P2.2b. Then ,
∗∗ =
n∑
i=1
βi
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi
(5.25)
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Corollary 5.10. The value of the objective function in Problem P2.2b at the
optimal solution is
Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ) = sD+
psκ−
∑n
i=1(pi + psβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi : if∗∗(D) < κ
pbκ−
∑n
i=1(pi + pbβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi : if∗∗(D) ≥ κ
(5.26)
Up to this point, we have found the optimal solution in Period 2 under the
Leontief production function and evaluated the corresponding profit for a given
revelation of demand and carbon market prices. Next, we study Period 1 when
we decide on the initial carbon permit purchase.
5.2.2 Period 1
Our objective in Period 1 is to find the initial carbon permit purchase, κ, that will
maximize the total expected profit. In this model, we assume a joint distribution
for demand and carbon market prices with a known p.d.f. f(., ., .) and c.d.f.
F (., ., .). Therefore, we look at Problem P2.1 under the Leontief production
function, which we call Problem P2.1b.
max
κ
Π1(κ) = −cκ+ ED,pb,ps (Π2((q∗∗b , q∗∗s ), ~x∗∗|κ)) (P2.1b)
s.t. κ ≥ 0
Even if the Leontief production function is not shown explicitly in the formulation,
it is considered in Period 2 and is in Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ) implicitly. First, we will
derive the first order conditions with respect to κ. Then we will look at concavity
of the objective function in κ.
First, we give some preliminary definitions that will help us in deriving the
solution.
Corollary 5.11. Let ω be a function of κ such that
κ =
n∑
i=1
βi
(
ω(κ)
Ai
) 1
αi
(5.27)
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for αi, βi, Ai > 0,∀i = 1, . . . , n and κ > 0. Then, ω(κ) is increasing in κ.
Lemma 5.10. The first order condition of the objective function in Problem
P2.1b with respect to κ gives∫
pb,ps
(
ps
∫ ω(κ∗)
0
f(pb, ps, D)dD + pb
∫ ∞
ω(κ∗)
f(pb, ps, D)dD
)
dpbps = c (5.28)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 5.11. The objective function of Problem P2.1b is concave in κ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 5.4. The unique optimal solution to Problem P2.1b, κ∗∗ = κ∗ where
κ∗ solves Equation 5.28.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 5.10 and 5.11.
We have found the optimal production and carbon trade policy for Problem
2 under the Leontief production function.
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Chapter 6
Numerical Study
In this chapter, we present a set of computational experiments in which we eval-
uate the optimal policies for Problem 1 and Problem 2 and discuss the sensitivity
of the optimal policy parameters in each problem with respect to various system
parameters. We construct our numerical analysis based on the Cobb-Douglas
Production Function. This chapter consists of three sections.
In Section 6.1, we focus on the important features of the optimal production
policy under a carbon cap in Problem 1 for the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. In Section 6.1.1, we construct an example based on agricultural production.
This example is motivated by a real life problem which is presented in the study
of Hatırlı et al. [18]. We study this example under different carbon cap tight-
nesses, demand variabilities and cost structures. We examine their affects on the
production policy parameters given by the production quantity Q∗∗, input quan-
tities x∗∗i , input allocation ratios, λ
∗∗, production cost, realized service level and
expected profit. We also consider the affect of changing technology level on the
production policy parameters under a carbon cap. In Section 6.1.2, we evaluate
the sensitivity of the production policy parameters with respect to changes in
input elasticities, input costs and carbon coefficients under a carbon cap.
In Section 6.2, we aim to study the optimal carbon trade policy in Problem
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2 under the Cobb-Douglas production function. We construct a numerical anal-
ysis to examine the sensitivity of the optimal policy parameters such as initial
carbon permit purchase κ∗∗, expected carbon permit trade in the market and
improvement over the no-contract policy (κ = 0) with respect to change in input
elasticities, input costs, demand distibution.
6.1 Production System and Sensitivity Analysis
under Carbon Cap Restrictions
In this section, we study on the essential features of the optimal production
policy under a carbon cap in Problem 1 for Cobb-Douglas production function.
We analyze the production policy parameters given by the production quantity
Q∗∗, input quantities x∗∗i , input allocation ratios, λ
∗∗, production cost, realized
service level and expected profit. We first construct a numerical example based
on a real life problem and then we conduct a sensitivity analysis under a carbon
cap for two inputs.
6.1.1 Agricultural Production System Analysis under
Carbon Cap Restrictions
In this study, we use the work by Hatırlı et al. [18], who study the relationship
between energy inputs and crop yield for greenhouse tomato production in An-
talya, Turkey. They collect the data by conducting face to face surveys in 2001
with forty randomly selected greenhouse operators in Central and Serik districts
of Antalya where the greenhouse farming is one of the most common economic ac-
tivities. In the study, the output is given by the tomato yield while the inputs are
fertilizer, chemicals, machinery, labor force, water for irrigation and seed. They
convert the output and the inputs to their energy equivalents. Then they exam-
ine the relationship between the inputs and the output under the Cobb-Douglas
production function.
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We construct an illustrative example based on the work of Hatırlı et al. [18].
In this example, we consider greenhouse tomato production, Q. The inputs are
fertilizer (x1), chemicals (x2), labor (x3), machinery (x4) and water for irrigation
(x5). We omit the input seed since the elasticity is found to be negative for this
input in [18]. However, while calculating the technology level, the contribution of
the seed (the input we have excluded in this example) will be considered. For the
sake of consistancy, the measured unit for each input have been taken as their
energy equivalents in mega joules (MJ).
The input elasticities (αi) are directly taken from the data provided in [18].
We rely on different sources for the derivation of the production costs (pi) with
the measured unit of TL/MJ and carbon coefficients (βi) with the measured
unit of kg Carbon Emitted/MJ. The details of our constructions are provided in
Appendix C. Parameter values for each input are given in Table 6.1.
We estimate the technology level A = 1.34 from the data in [18] as explained
in Appendix C. The selling price for tomato is calculated as s = 2.875 TL/MJ
as shown in Appendix C. We assume uniformly distributed demand with mean
D = 130000 MJ.
In the analysis, we study this example under various cost ratios, coefficients
of variation and carbon cap tightnessess.
In the classical newsvendor problem, the service level, the probability of sat-
isfying all of the demand, is given by s+cs
s+cs+ce
. In this study, we work with a base
service level 95%. We assume that the stockout cost is given by a ratio of the
selling price and calculate the excess cost based on these values. We conduct our
analysis with cs/s  {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}. The corresponding values of stockout and
excess costs as a result of these calculations are shown in Table 6.2.
We also analyze the example under different coefficients of variance, which
are given by COV  {0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2} (Table 6.3).
In our analysis, we also study the affect of the carbon cap tightness. We
first solve Problem 1 without carbon cap constraint (Problem P1Ua)for the
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given parameters and calculate the carbon emission, 1U . Then we tighten
the carbon cap by a percentage δ. In this case, the carbon cap is given by
κ = (1 − δ)1U . In this example, we consider the percentage carbon cap tight-
nesses, δ  {0%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 25− 50%}.
In this study, we examine a total of 3× 4× 31 = 372 experiments. Below, we
provide the pseudocode that we use in MATLAB for the analysis. This process
takes less than three minutes of CPU time.
Algorithm 1: Optimal solution under carbon cap restriction
BEGIN
INITIALIZE parameters s, D, A and αi, pi, βi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
SET cs/s  {0.1, 0.2, 0.4} and calculate cs and ce
SET COV  {0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2} and calculate minimum (Dl) and maximum demand (Dh)
SET FoundRoot1 := 0 and FoundRoot2 := 0
FOR Q = 0→ 2Dh with ∆Q = 0.1
IF FoundRoot1 == 0 and dΠ(Q)dQ > 0 (Eqn. 4.11)
Set Q∗1 := Q and FoundRoot1 := 1
IF FoundRoot1 :== 1 and dΠ(Q)dQ < 0 (Eqn. 4.11)
Set Q∗2 := Q, FoundRoot2 := 1 and EXIT FOR LOOP
IF FoundRoot2 = 1
Set Q∗∗unc := 0 and END
ELSE
Compute Π(Q∗2) and Π(0) (Eqn. 4.9)
IF Π(Q∗2) > Π(0)
Set Q∗∗unc := Q
∗
2 and compute F(Q
∗∗
unc), x
∗∗
i (Q
∗∗
unc) (Eqn. 4.6), Γ
∗∗(Q∗∗unc)
(Eqn. 4.7) and ∗∗U1(Q
∗∗
unc) (Eqn. 4.8)
ELSE
Set Q∗∗unc := 0 and END
SET δ  {0%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 25− 50%}
Compute κ = (1− δ)∗∗U1(Q∗∗unc)
FOR λ = 0→ 700 with ∆λ = 0.0001
Compute Q (Eqn. 4.26)
IF dΠ̂(Q)dQ < 0 (Eqn 4.23)
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Set Q∗ := Q, λ∗ := λ and EXIT FOR LOOP
Compute Π̂(Q∗) (Eqn. 4.21)
IF Π̂(Q∗) > Π(0)
Set Q∗∗ := Q∗ and λ∗∗ := λ∗
Compute F(Q∗∗), x∗∗i (Q
∗∗) (Eqn. 4.19) and Γ(~x∗∗(Q∗∗)) (Eqn. 4.2)
ELSE
Set Q∗∗ := 0 and λ∗∗ := 0
END
In this algorithm, we first initialize parameters and set the values for COV
and cs/s ratio that we use in the experiment. Then, we conduct a linear search for
Q with the increment ∆Q = 0.1 on the interval [0, 2Dh] where Dh = D+COV
√
3.
Next, we inspect the behavior of the objective function Π(Q) with respect to Q
and find the extremum point(s) that change the sign of the first derivative of the
objective function. Note that Q∗∗unc may take a positive value if and only if Q
∗
1
is a local minimum and Q∗2 is a local maximum by Theorem 4.2 since r > 1 in
the example we consider. Therefore, we construct this algorithm so that the first
root we find Q∗1 gives the local minimum and the second root Q
∗
2 gives the local
maximum, if they exist.
After the seach for the extrema points ends, we evaluate whether we have
found two roots. If not, we conclude that Q∗∗unc = 0. It implies that we should
not produce at all when there is no carbon constraint and further investigation
with the carbon emission constraint is unnecessary. Thus, we end the algorithm.
Otherwise, by Theorem 4.2, we conclude that Q∗∗unc  {0, Q∗2}. Then, we compute
the expected profits and set Q∗∗unc as the solution that yields the maximum profit.
If Q∗∗unc = 0, we do not investigate the case with carbon emission contraint as ex-
plained above. If Q∗∗unc = Q
∗
2, then we compute F(Q
∗∗
unc) and x
∗∗
i (Q
∗∗
unc), Γ
∗∗(Q∗∗unc)
and ∗∗U1(Q
∗∗
unc) as given in Theorem 4.1.
Next, we set a percentage carbon cap tightness on the emission level under no
carbon cap. Then, for each tightness, we compute the corresponding carbon cap,
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κ. In our preliminary numerical study based on a search for λ on the interval
[0,10000], we have observed that there exists a unique λ∗∗ and corresponding
Q∗∗(λ∗∗) (given by Equation 4.26) that solve Equation 4.24. Therefore, in this
algorithm, we conduct a linear search on λ with the increment ∆λ = 0.0001
on the interval [0, 700]. For each λ value, we compute the corresponding Q by
Lemma 4.9. Note that by Lemma 4.10, there exists a unique Q for each λ. Then,
we find the local maximum point (λ∗, Q∗) where the sign of dΠ̂(Q)
dQ
changes from
positive to negative. The algorithm ends with the comparison of the objective
function values at (λ∗, Q∗) and (0, 0) in order to find the optimal solution under
a carbon cap, κ.
In order to double check, we consider Corollary 4.9 for a given λ. We find
two positive roots, Q∗1 and Q
∗
2, that solve Equation 4.12. For instance, under
COV = 0.5 and cs/s = 0.1, we find Q
∗
1 = 0.4 and Q
∗
2 = 225340.2 for λ =
1.5995, and Q∗1 = 0.6 and Q
∗
2 = 224737.4 for λ = 2.2166. Our algorithm gives
(λ∗∗, Q∗∗)=(1.5995, 225340.2) under δ = 75% and (λ∗∗, Q∗∗)=(2.2166, 224737.4)
under δ = 72%. Thus, we conclude that the local maximum point Q∗2 that satisfy
Equation 4.12 for λ∗∗ is the optimal solution we find in the algorithm.
Now, we discuss the impacts of the change in cs/s ratio, COV and carbon
cap tightness on the optimal policy parameters: the expected profit, λ∗∗, Q∗∗, x∗∗i
∀i = 1, . . . , n, input allocation ratios, the production cost and the realized service
level given by F (Q∗∗).
First, we aim to observe the affects of the change in cs/s ratios on the optimal
production policy parameters. Figure 6.1 shows the expected profit as a function
of the percentage carbon cap tightness for every instance of cs/s  {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}
and COV  {0.58, 0.2}. We observe that as cs/s increases, the expected profit
decreases and this affect is more profound under higher demand variances. This
result is expected since an increase in the stockout cost and excess cost leads to a
decrease in the expected profit, especially under the presence of higher uncertainty
in demand. However, we should note that the impact of cs/s on the expected
profit does not seem to be significant. When we move from cs/s = 0.1 to cs/s =
0.4 under COV = 0.2, we observe that the decrease in profit is under 3% for all
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percentage carbon cap tighnesses.
We can interpret λ∗∗ as the shadow price of increasing the carbon cap by one
unit, thus it implies the significance of the carbon cap constraint. In Figure 6.2,
we see λ∗∗ as a function of the percentage carbon cap tightness for every instance
of cs/s  {0.1, 0.2, 0.4} and COV  {0.58, 0.2}. We observe that λ∗∗ increases
in cs/s for all COV values. This increase is more profound under a tight carbon
cap. For instance, when we change cs/s = 0.1 to cs/s = 0.4, the change in λ
∗∗ is
approximately 28% for all COV values at carbon cap tightness of δ = 50% while
we observe no change at all upto δ = 15%. This implies meeting the carbon cap
requirement becomes more difficult for a tight carbon cap under higher stockout
and excess costs as expected.
Even though the change in cs/s ratio have some affect on the expected
profit and λ∗∗ values, it does not seem to have any affect on the produc-
tion quantity. Figure 6.3 shows the production quantity as a function of the
percentage carbon cap tightness for every instance of cs/s  {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}
and COV  {0.58, 0.5, 0.33 0.2}. We observe that the optimal production
quantity does not show a notable change (less than 1%) in cs/s for a given
COV and δ. In Table 6.4, we see the input quantities for every instance
of the parameters COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2, cs/s = 0.1 0.2, 0.4 and
δ = 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 30%, 40%, 50%. We observe that the input quan-
tities do not change significantly for alternative cs/s ratios under a given COV
and δ. It is observed from the Table 6.4, that an increase in cs/s from 0.1
to 0.4 leads to less than 1% increase in x∗∗1 , less than 3% increase in x
∗∗
2 , less
than 6% increase in x∗∗3 , less than 0.5% change in x
∗∗
4 and less than 3% change
in x∗∗5 for all instances with the parameters COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2 and
δ = 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 30%, 40%, 50%.
We conclude that cs/s does not have a significant affect on the production
quantity Q∗∗ and input quantities x∗∗i , ∀i = 1, . . . , n. Thus the change in cs/s
does not affect the production cost. For instance, when we move from cs/s = 0.1
to cs/s = 0.4, the increase in the production cost for all COV and δ is observed to
be at most 3%. When we consider the expected profit-production cost ratio, the
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values change do not chage significantly; for instance, at COV = 0.2 and δ = 45%,
the ratio gives 16.95 and 16.38 for cs/s = 0.1 and cs/s = 0.4, respectively.
Next, we observe the affect of coefficient of variation on the optimal production
policy parameters. Since we have already covered the affect of cs/s, we conduct
our further analysis based on one instance of cs/s = 0.1.
In Figure 6.1, we observe that the expected profit decreases in demand
variance. When we increase the coefficient of variation from COV = 0.2 to
COV = 0.58, we observe an approximately 5% decrease for all δ values under
cs/s = 0.1. This result is expected since highly varying demand leads to a de-
crease in the expected profit.
In Figure 6.2, we observe that when the coefficient of variation is increased
from COV = 0.2 to COV = 0.58, λ∗∗ decreases. This decrease is more profound
in tighter carbon cap restrictions. For instance, the change in coefficient of vari-
ation from COV = 0.2 to COV = 0.58 under cs/s = 0.1 leads 45% decrease in
λ∗∗ at δ = 50% while we observe less than 1% decrease in λ∗∗ for δ < 15%. We
can infer from this result that when the demand is highly variable, the carbon
cap restriction becomes less significant as expected.
Figure 6.3 shows that the production quantity Q∗∗ increases by around 42%
for all δ values under cs/s = 0.1 when we increase the coefficient of variation
from COV = 0.2 to COV = 0.58. This result implies that demand uncertainty
is high, we tend to produce more as expected.
In Table 6.4, we observe that the input quantities used in production are
greater for higher demand variances. This is expected since the we produce more
under higher demand variances as concluded previously. When we compare the
input quantities for COV = 0.58 to those for COV = 0.2, we observe that we
use 14-38% more inputs in the production process depending on the δ values.
Figure 6.4 shows the production cost as a function of the percentage carbon
cap tightness for every instance of cs/s = 0.1 and COV  {0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2}.
We observe that the expected production cost is increasing in demand variance.
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This result is also expected as increasing input quantities lead to a higher pro-
duction cost. When we compare the production costs for COV = 0.58 and
COV = 0.2, we observe that at higher coefficient of variation the production
cost increase between 24-30% depending on the δ values. When we consider the
expected profit-production cost ratio, the values do not chage significantly; for
instance, at cs/s = 0.1 and δ = 45%, the ratio decreases in COV and takes values
between 13.09 and 16.95.
In Figure 6.5, we see the realized service level as a function of the
percentage carbon cap tightness for every instance of cs/s = 0.1 and
COV  {0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2}. When we consider the realized service level un-
der the optimal production policy, we observe that higher demand variance yield
higher service levels as expected due to the increase in the production quantity.
While the difference between the realized service levels for COV = 0.58 and
COV = 0.2 is less than 1% for δ < 35%, at δ = 50%, this difference reaches 21%
under cs/s = 0.1.
Finally, we consider the optimal production policy parameters with respect to
the percentage carbon cap tightness. In Figure 6.1, we observe that the expected
profit decreases in the percentage carbon cap tightness as expected. This decrease
becomes steep after 30% carbon cap tightness.
We observe in Figure 6.2 that λ∗∗ values increase in the percentage carbon cap
tightness. The increase in λ∗∗ is observed to be steeper for δ > 30%. This result
is expected since the tighter the carbon cap, more difficult meeting the carbon
cap restriction.
For further investigation, we consider Table 6.5, where λ∗∗ values are compared
to ∆Exp.Profit
∆Emission
for all δ, COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2 and cs/s = 0.1. We observe
that ∆Exp.Profit
∆Emission
takes close, but slightly smaller values to λ∗∗. The difference is
caused by the large intervals. If we consider smaller intervals than 1% for the
percentage carbon cap tightness, we expect ∆Exp.Profit
∆Emission
to take almost identical
values as λ∗∗. It implies that the shadow price of the carbon cap constraint
is given by the incremental change in the expected profit with respect to the
incremental change in the carbon emission at the given carbon cap.
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Figure 6.3 shows that as the percentage carbon cap tightness increases, pro-
duction quantity Q∗∗ decreases. We observe a steeper decrease in Q∗∗ for δ > 30%.
This result implies that for tighter carbon cap restrictions, we tend to produce
less to meet the carbon cap as expected.
In order to analyze the impact of the percentage carbon cap tightness on the
expected profit and production quantity Q∗∗ in depth, we plot the percentage de-
creases in the expected profit and Q∗∗ with respect to the expected profit and Q∗∗unc
values found in the carbon cap unconstrained problem as a function of the percent-
age carbon cap tightness. The percentage decreases in the expected profit and Q∗∗
are found to be almost identical for all instances of cs/s  {0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2}
and COV  {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}. Therefore, we only present our findings for the case
where COV = 0.58 and cs/s = 0.1 in Figure 6.6. Figure 6.6 show that the
percentage decrease in Q∗∗ is always greater than the percentage decrease in the
expected profit under the increasing carbon cap tightness. We also observe that
the difference between the percentage changes of the expected profit and Q∗∗
grows in δ. For instance, at the percentage decreases in the expected profit and
Q∗∗ is 0.5% and 1.4%, respectively for δ = 30% while they become 7.8% and
22.7% for δ = 50%.
The percentage decrease in the realized service level with respect to the carbon
cap tightness is almost identical to the change in Q∗∗. Therefore, the comments
for the change in Q∗∗ with respect to the carbon cap tightness also hold for the
realized service level.
Next, we consider the change in the input quantities and the input allocation
with respect to the percentage carbon cap tightness. In Table 6.4, we observe the
impact of the carbon cap tightness on the input quantities. We observe that the
input quantities behave in a similar way in changing carbon cap tightness for all
COV and cs/s parameter values. For better illustration, we examine Figure 6.7
where the input quantities are given as a function of the percentage carbon cap
tightness at COV = 0.58 and cs/s = 0.1. We observe that as carbon cap tightness
increases, we use the irrigations systems (x∗∗5 ) less while relying on labor (x
∗∗
3 ),
fertilizer (x∗∗1 ) and chemicals (x
∗∗
2 ). On the other hand, there is no significant
86
change in machinery (x∗∗4 ) use. When the carbon cap tightness exceeds 35%,
the use of fertilizer and chemicals begin to decrease due to smaller production
quantities.
The input allocation ratios are given in Table 6.6 for δ = 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%,
30%, 40%, 50% COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2 and cs/s = 0.1. In this table, we
observe the change in input allocation with respect to the normalizing input x∗∗1 .
We observe that the allocations of chemicals (x∗∗2 ) and labor (x
∗∗
3 ) are always
increasing while the allocations of machinery (x∗∗4 ) and water for irrigation (x
∗∗
5 )
are decreasing in the percentage carbon cap tightness for all instances under
COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2 and cs/s = 0.1.
Figure 6.4 shows that the production cost increases in the percentage carbon
cap tightness upto 45% and then begins to decrease. This decrease results from
the significant decrease in the production quantity in the percentage carbon cap
as discussed previously. For COV = 0.58 and cs/s = 0.1, the production cost
increases upto δ = 45% and reaches an increase by 20% compared to δ = 0% level.
When we consider the production cost at δ = 50%, it is only 16% greater than
the production cost at δ = 0%. We observe that the expected profit-production
cost ratio do not chage significantly in the carbon tightness; for instance, at
COV = 0.58 and cs/s = 0.1, the ratio decreases in δ and takes values between
12.99 and 16.36.
We also consider the change in the realized service level with respect to the
change in the percentage carbon cap tightness. In Figure 6.5, we observe that
the realized service level steeply decreases in the percentage carbon cap tightness
for δ > 35%. For instance, at COV = 0.2 and cs/s = 0.1, the realized service
level under no carbon cap is 93% while it drops to 92% at δ = 30% and 51% at
δ = 50%.
Based on our observations so far, we conclude that the carbon emission under
no cap restrictions can be decreased by at least 35% without any significant effect
on the expected profit and the realized service level for all COV and cs/s values
considered in this analysis. At carbon cap tightness of 35%, the expected profit
only decreases by approximately 1% while the realized service level only decreases
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from 93% to 90%. This change can be created by decresing the production
quantity by approximately 3% and altering the input allocation as suggested in
Table 6.7.
Another alternative in dealing with carbon cap restrictions is improvement
in production technology. In our analysis, we study the affect of technology
improvement on production system and expected profit for the base case with
parameters COV = 0.58 and cs/s = 0.1. We first find the optimal production
policy parameters under technology improvements of 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%.
We also calculate the emission levels and percentage emission reductions com-
pared to the base case. Then we empose these reduction levels by a carbon cap
under no technology improvement in order to compare the effect of technology
improvement under a carbon cap. The results are presented in Table 6.8.
With technology improvements, not only we decrease our emission level, but
also we slightly improve on the realized service levels and increase the expected
profit compared to the base case. For instance, at 50% technology improvement,
we reduce the emission by 25% while increasing the expected profit by 1.6% and
the realized service level from 93.2% to 93.6%. We also note that the input
quantities decrease with the increasing technology level while keeping the ratio
of the input quantities constant. For 50% technology improvement, we observe
this decrease to be 25% for each input.
We also observe that the carbon cap restriction can be met by improving the
technology level rather than changing the input allocations and decreasing the
production quantity. Under a given carbon cap, we may produce with the given
technology by adjusting our production system or we may improve the technology
to meet the carbon cap. For instance, for 33% reduction in the emission level,
the expected profit with technology improvement is 9013 TL greater than the
expected profit with no improvement. It implies that we should improve the
technology level by 75% if this improvement costs less than 9013 TL. Moreover,
with 75%technology improvement under 33% carbon cap tightness, the realized
service level is increased from 91.4% to 93.8%.
In Table 6.9, we present the expected benefit of technology improvement over
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no improvement case under a given emission reduction by a carbon cap. These
results are inferred from the data in Table 6.8. For a strict carbon cap, we observe
that the expected benefit of technology improvement is an increasing and convex
function of the technology level under the given carbon cap. It implies that under
technology improvement cost is linear, the net expected benefit increases as the
carbon cap decreases. It suggests that technology improvement is more important
under more strict carbon cap restrictions.
6.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Production Policy under
a Carbon Cap
In this section, we focus on the sensitivity of the optimal production policy param-
eters with respect to change in input elasticities, input costs, carbon coefficients
under a carbon cap.
We consider a production system with two inputs and constant rate of return,
r = 1. We assume technology level A = 1. For input 1, we assume p1 = 1 and
β1 = 1. We set the selling price, s = 50, stockout cost cs = 5 and we calculate
the excess cost based on the assumption of 95% the service level in the classical
newsvendor problem, i.e. s+cs
s+cs+ce
= 95%. The demand is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over [0, 1000]. We analyze this system under the parameter set in
Table 6.10 that gives a total of 2× 2× 2× 2 = 16 experiments.
For computations, we use MATLAB with a similar procedure explained in the
previous section. In this example, we have assumed r = 1. Note that our choice
of parameters satisfies the condition: s + cs ≥
∏n
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
A
. By Theorem 4.2, a
positive Q∗∗unc is directly given by Equation 4.14. The search for λ
∗∗ proceeds as
in the given algorithm.
The results are presented in Table 6.11. We consider the case α2 = 0.9. It
implies that the production process relies on the input 2.
First, we observe the change in the optimal production policy parameters for
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(p2, β2) = (0.25, 0.25). This case implies that the production process relies on
the low cost-low carbon emitting input. We observe that the input quantity is
significantly higher for input 2 under no carbon cap and the input allocation
given by x∗∗2 /x
∗∗
1 does not change under a carbon cap tightness of 50%. We also
observe that the production quantity decreases by 50% while the decrease in the
expected profit is 27.7%.
Now, we consider the case (p2, β2) = (0.25, 4.00). In this case, the production
process relies on the low cost-high carbon emitting input. We observe that even
though the input quantity is significantly higher for input 2 under no carbon cap
and the input allocation changes in favor of the less carbon emitting input with
higher cost, input 1, under a carbon cap tightness of 50%. Another observation
is that the producition quantity decreases by 40.3% while the expected profit
decreases by 18.7%. The decrease in the expected profit is less compared to the
previous case since this case includes a trade-off of using low cost-high carbon
emitting input or high cost-low carbon emitting input in the production. On
the other hand, in the previous case, the production system is already at its top
performance in terms of the input allocation by relying on the low cost-low carbon
emitting input, and only high reductions in the production quantity help meeting
the carbon cap, which reduces the expected profit due to lost sales and stockout
costs.
Next, we examine the case (p2, β2) = (4.00, 0.25). This case considers a
production process that relies on the high cost-low carbon emitting input. We
observe that the input quantities are more balanced under no carbon cap com-
pared to the low cost cases we have studied above. However, the input allocation
is still in favor of input 2 and input 2 becomes more dominant in the production
under a carbon cap tightness of 50%. The production quantity decreases only by
9.2% whereas the decrease in the expected profit is 3.1%. Since the input alloca-
tion under no carbon cap is more balanced compared to the previous case, there
exists a room for improvement by increasing the allocation of the less carbon
emitting input, input 2 in this case.
Lastly, we study the case (p2, β2) = (4.00, 4.00). In this case, the production
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process relies on the high cost-high carbon emitting input. In our analysis, we
observe that the input quantities are more balanced and in favor of the input 2
under no carbon cap. We also observe that the allocation of the inputs do not
change under a carbon cap tightness of 50% even though the production quantity
is decreased by 50%. A change in the allocation does not occur since there does
not exist a trade-off for changing the input allocation under the given parameter
values at the presense of a carbon cap. Another observation is that the expected
profit decreases by 28.2% for this case.
We do not examine the other cases since they are equivalent to the scenarios
that we discussed above and yield similar results. For instance, (α2, p2, β2) =
(0.9, 4.00, 0.25) is equivalent to (α2, p2, β2) = (0.1, 0.25, 4.00) in the sense that
the input elasticity of the high cost-low carbon emitting input is higher, i.e. the
production process relies more on this input.
So far, we have observed that the optimal input quantity is significantly high
when the elasticity of the the low cost-low carbon emitting input is higher. These
results are expected since we always prefer to use cheaper and less carbon emit-
ting resource with greater contribution on the production process. We have also
observed that under a carbon cap, the input allocation changes in favor of the
input with carbon coefficients.
Our final observation is that the least percentage decrease in the ex-
pected profit under a carbon cap is obtained in two cases: (α2, p2, β2) =
(0.9, 4.00, 0.25) and (0.1, 0.25, 4.00). While we only have 3.1% and 1.1% de-
crease in the expected profit under a carbon cap, respectively, the percentage
decrease is between 18.7% and 28.2% for other cases. This result indicates that
when our production system relies more on the less carbon emitting input, the
expected profit is affected less by the carbon cap. This finding provides evidence
on the importance of swiching to less carbon emitting inputs.
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6.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Carbon Permit
Contract Policy under Emission Trading
Scheme
In this section, we present an illustrative example in order to study the carbon
permit contract policy parameters under different sets of input elasticities, input
costs and demand distributions for the Cobb-Douglas production function.
We analyze a production system with two resources and constant rate of
return, r = 1. We set a fixed technology level A = 50. The carbon coefficients
are assumed to be (β1, β2) = (15, 45). This implies that the input 1 is the low
carbon emitting input while the input 2 is the high carbon emitting input. The
selling price is taken as s = 3. We assume the carbon contract c = 0.5 and the
following independent distributions for carbon market prices:
pb =

0.5 w/prob0.2
0.55 w/prob0.4
0.6 w/prob0.4
ps =

0.4 w/prob0.4
0.45 w/prob0.5
0.5 w/prob0.1
For our analysis, we choose three demand distributions with mean 1000 and
standard deviation 288. These are UNI:Uniform(500, 1500), TRIA 1:Triangu-
lar(44.3, 543.3, 1813.3) and TRIA 2:Triangular(186.7, 1356.7, 1456.7). We
choose UNI since each demand in the interval is equally probable. The reason we
consider TRIA1 and TRIA2 is that the mass of the distribution is concentrated
at either sides of the mean for each distribution. TRIA1 is a right-skewed distri-
bution with relatively few high demand values whereas TRIA2 is a left-skewed
distribution with relatively few low demand values. In addition, we study this
example under the experiment instances given in Table 6.12.
In this study, we examine a total of 5× 3 = 15 instances. We use MATLAB
for computations and the pseudocode we use is provided below. This process
takes less than 5 minutes of CPU time.
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Algorithm 2: Optimal solution under emission trading scheme
BEGIN
INITIALIZE parameters s, A, c, βi ∀i = 1, . . . , n and distributions for pb, ps
SET the demand distribution  {UNI, TRIA1, TRIA2}
SET αi, pi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n for the experiment instance  {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
FOR κ = 0→ 5000 with ∆κ = 0.01
FOR pb  {0.5, 0.55, 0.6}
Compute e(pb, κ) (Eqn. 5.18)
FOR ps  {0.4, 0.45, 0.5}
Compute e(ps, κ) (Eqn. 5.18)
FOR D = e(ps, κ)→ e(pb, κ) with ∆D = 0.1
FOR λ = ps → pb with ∆λ = 0.0001
Compute κ˜(λ) (Eqn. 5.12)
IF κ˜(λ) <= κ
Set λ∗∗pb,ps,D := λ and EXIT FOR LOOP
Compute dΠ1dκ
IF dΠ1dκ < 0
Set κ∗∗ := κ, compute Π1 (Eqn. 5.4) and EXIT FOR LOOP
END
In this algorithm, we first initialize the parameters and set the experiment.
Then, we begin on a search for initial carbon contract purchase κ on the interval
[0,5000] with the increment ∆κ = 0.01. Next, we consider the distributions of
the carbon market prices. For each possible value that pb and ps may take, we
determine the demand limits e(pb, κ) and e(ps, κ) from Equation 5.18. Note that
between these limits, the optimal carbon trade policy in Period 2 suggests to
produce with carbon emission κ by Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.8. Then, for
each demand point between e(pb, κ) and e(ps, κ) under a given pb and ps, we
search for λ on the interval [ps,pb] with the increment ∆λ = 0.01 that satisfies
Equation 5.12. Next, we evaluate the first derivative of the objective function
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Π1 with respect to κ. By Lemma 5.7, the objective function is concave in κ.
Therefore, we consider the sign change in the first derivative, we conclude that
κ∗∗ := κ when the sign changes from positive to negative and stop our search for
κ.
Now, we discuss the initial permit purchase with the carbon permit contract,
the expected carbon trade at the contract purchase decision epoch and the com-
parison with the no-contract policy.
First, we study the advance carbon permit purchase with the contract under
the given parameters. The results are presented in Table 6.13 for each experiment
instance under the distributions UNI, TRIA1 and TRIA2. When we compare the
experiment instances 1, 2, 4 and 5, we observe that as the elasticity of the low
cost-high carbon emitting input increases with respect to the high cost-low car-
bon emitting input, we tend to purchase more with the carbon permit contract.
For instance, by observing the experiment instances 1 and 5, we conclude that
switching from high-cost-low carbon emitting input to low cost-high carbon emit-
ting input may increase the amount of carbon permit purchased by more than
twice as much.
We can also observe that the amount of the carbon purchase is the greatest
at TRIA2 and the smallest at TRIA1 compared to the other distributions. It
implies that when the demand is concentrated at lower values, the carbon permit
contract becomes less significant.
Another observation we can infer from this table is that when the input prices
are more dispersed, the amount of carbon purchased with the contract increases
as seen in the comparison of the experiment instances 2 and 3. It suggests that
we tend to rely on the carbon permit contract more when the difference between
the costs of inputs increases.
Next, we evaluate how much carbon permit we expect to trade in the future
when we decide on the initial carbon purchase with the contract. In Table 6.14,
these results are presented under all experiment instances and demand distri-
butions: UNI, TRIA1, TRIA2. In order to compute these values, we assume
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that we have purchased κ∗∗ given in Table 6.13 with the carbon permit contract.
Then, we calculate the expected permit to buy and expected permit to sell under
the given carbon market price distributions for each demand distribution: UNI,
TRIA1, TRIA2.
When we compare the results we have found for the experimental instances
1, 2, 4 and 5 under all demand distributions in Table 6.14, we observe that both
the expected permit to buy and sell values increase as the elasticity of the low
cost-high carbon emitting input increases. These increases are observed to be
more than twice as much when we consider the experimental instances 1 and 5.
It suggests that when the production process relies on the high carbon emitting
input, we expect to become more active in the carbon trade market.
Another observation from Table 6.14 is that the dispersion of the input costs
results in higher expected permit to buy and sell values as seen in comparison of
the experimental instances 2 and 3. This result is expected since we tend to use
more of high carbon emitting input when its cost is relatively lower than the low
carbon emitting input and it increases the activity in the carbon trade market.
It is important to note that in Table 6.14, we observe that the expected
permit to buy is the greatest for TRIA1 and the smallest for TRIA2 under all the
experiment instances. Inversely, the expected permit to sell is the greatest for
TRIA2 and the smallest for TRIA1. It implies when the demand is concentrated
on the lower values, we expect to buy more permit in the future. On the other
hand, when the demand is concentrated on the higher values, we expect to sell
more permit in the future. These results are intuitive. For instance, we purchase
more permit with the contract under TRIA2 demand distribution as seen in Table
6.13; therefore, we expect to buy less and sell more permit compared to the other
demand distributions UNI and TRIA1.
When we examine the net difference between the expected permit to buy
in the future and the expected permit to sell for each experiment instances, we
observe that the expected permit to buy in the future exceeds the expected permit
to sell for demand distributions UNI and TRIA1, and this difference is more
significant for TRIA1 demand distribution. It implies that the optimal carbon
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contract policy suggests further carbon purchase in the future when the demand
is equally distributed over the interval or concentrated on lower values. For
TRIA2 distribution, we observe that the expected permit to sell is greater than
the expected permit to buy. This result is expected since it implies that when
the demand is concentrated at higher values, the optimal carbon contract policy
suggests to buy more permit with the contract than we may expect to use. For
instance, we expect to buy 1.9% more permit for UNI and 6.9% more for TRIA1
distribution under the experiment instance 5. For TRIA2 distribution under the
experiment instance 5, we expected to sell 3.1% of the permit we have purchased
with the contract.
Finally, we observe the impact of introducing a carbon permit contract. We
evaluate the expected profit and the carbon emission under the optimal carbon
contract policy, κ∗∗, and no contract policy, κ = 0. Then, we calculate the
percentage improvement over the no contract policy as well as the increase in
emission. The results are presented in Table 6.15.
We observe in Table 6.15 that the expected profit decreases and the expected
emission increases as the elasticity of the low cost-high carbon emitting input
increases. For instance, changing the input elasticity of the low cost-high carbon
emitting input from 0.1 (experimental instance 1) to 0.8 (experimental instance
5) decreases the expected profit by 11% for the optimal carbon contract policy.
When we consider the same experiment instances, we observe that the expected
emission increases more than twice as much.
Another observation is that the expected profit decreases and the expected
emission increases when the input costs become dispersed. When we compare
the experiment instances 2 and 3 for the optimal carbon contract policy, we
observe that the dispersion of the input costs decreases the expected profit by
approximately 12% while increasing the expected emission by 11%.
It is also important to note that the expected profit and the expected emission
do not depend on the type of demand distribution. From Table 6.15, we can
observe that there is no significant change in the values for different demand
distributions.
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When we compare the expected profit and carbon emission of the optimal
contract policy and the no-contract policy in Table 6.15, we observe that we
obtain higher profits with the contract while emitting more carbon. The greatest
expected profit improvement over the no-contract policy (3.64%) is obtained for
the experimental instance 4. The corresponding increase in the expected emission
is only 0.88%.
The results of this sensitivity analysis indicate that carbon permit contract
provides an opportunity for increasing the expected profit, but it also leads to
higher carbon emission. We also conclude that when the elasticity of the low
cost-high carbon emitting input is significantly greater than the elasticity of the
high cost-low carbon emitting input, in other words, when our production system
mostly depends on the low cost-high carbon emitting input, the carbon permit
contract and the carbon trade gain importance. We tend to purchase more permit
with the contract and expect to be more active in the carbon trade market while
obtaining lower expected profit. This result is expected since relying on high
carbon emitting resources leads to become more dependent on the carbon trade
market.
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Figures of the Numerical Study
Figure 6.1: Expected profit as a function of carbon cap tightness at COV =
0.58, 0.2, cs/s = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4
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Figure 6.2: Optimal λ∗∗ as a function of carbon cap tightness at COV = 0.58, 0.2,
cs/s = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4
Figure 6.3: Optimal production quantity as a function of carbon cap tightness at
COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2, cs/s = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4
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Figure 6.4: Expected production cost as a function of carbon cap tightness at
COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2, cs/s = 0.1
Figure 6.5: Service Level as a function of carbon cap tightness at COV =
0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2, cs/s = 0.1
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Figure 6.6: The percentage decrease in the expected profit and the production
quantity with respect to the values found in the carbon cap unconstrained prob-
lem as a function of carbon cap tightness at COV = 0.58, cs/s = 0.1
Figure 6.7: Input allocation as a function of carbon cap tightness at COV = 0.58,
cs/s = 0.1
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Tables of the Numerical Study
Input Cost Carbon Coef.
Parameter Elasticity (TL/MJ) (kg CE /MJ)
fertilizer 0.24 0.1278 0.0197
chemical 0.19 0.5929 0.0504
labor 0.15 1.3043 0.0398
machinery 0.56 1.7217 0.3542
water for irrigation 0.23 0.2689 0.2951
Table 6.1: Parameter values for the inputs
cs/s cs (TL/MJ) ce (TL/MJ)
0.1 0.144 0.0834
0.2 0.288 0.0909
0.4 0.576 0.1061
Table 6.2: Parameter set for the stockout and excess costs base on a base service
level of 95%
coefficient minimum maximum
of variation demand demand
0.20 84967 175033
0.33 54951 205048
0.50 17417 242583
0.58 0 260000
Table 6.3: Parameter set for demand values
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35% cap tightness
input minimum change maximum change
x∗∗1 + 20% + 22%
x∗∗2 + 51% + 56%
x∗∗3 + 91% + 102%
x∗∗4 + 4% + 5%
x∗∗5 - 69% - 70%
Table 6.7: Percentage change in input quantities under 35% carbon emission
reduction at COV = 0.58, 0.5, 0.33, 0.2, cs/s = 0.1, 0.2, 0.4
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% emission reduction required % of expected benefit of
by a carbon cap technology improvement technology improvement
15% 25% 3290.1
25% 50% 6082.1
33% 75% 9013.0
39% 100% 12891.4
Table 6.9: Expected benefit of technology improvement over no improvement case
under a carbon cap at COV = 0.58, cs/s = 0.1
Parameter Values
Elasticity of input 2 (α2) (0.9, 0.1)
Purchase cost of input 2 (p2) (0.25, 4)
Carbon coef. of input 2 (β2) (0.25, 4)
Carbon cap tightness (δ) (0%, 50%)
Table 6.10: Parameter set
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Experiment Input elasticities Input costs
instance (α1, α2) (p1, p2)
1 (0.9, 0.1) (30, 15)
2 (0.8, 0.2) (30, 15)
3 (0.8, 0.2) (40, 10)
4 (0.5, 0.5) (30, 15)
5 (0.2, 0.8) (30, 15)
Table 6.12: Experiment instances
Experiment Demand Distribution
instance UNI TRIA1 TRIA2
1 488.3 465.6 514.2
2 679.0 647.5 715.0
3 754.0 719.4 794.2
4 1176.2 1121.6 1238.6
5 1260.6 1202.0 1327.5
Table 6.13: Initial carbon permit purchase with the contract, κ∗∗, under the
experiment instances and demand distributions: UNI, TRIA1, TRIA2
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Expected Permit to Buy in Period 2
Experiment Demand Distribution
instance UNI TRIA1 TRIA2
1 65.2 73.8 49.7
2 89.1 101.0 67.5
3 94.7 107.8 70.7
4 153.6 174.2 115.9
5 169.2 191.4 129.1
Expected Permit to Sell in Period 2
Experiment Demand Distribution
instance UNI TRIA1 TRIA2
1 56.0 41.7 65.8
2 76.8 57.0 90.6
3 82.3 60.4 97.5
4 132.5 98.3 156.7
5 145.3 108.5 170.8
Table 6.14: Expected carbon permit trade in Period 2 when making the initial
permit purchase under the experiment instances and demand distributions: UNI,
TRIA1, TRIA2
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers production
functions in the newsvendor setting. Additionally, there has been no study on
the production with multiple inputs under a carbon emission constraint. Our
work is significant in the sense that it incorporates all of these aspects.
In this thesis, we analyze two problems in the newsvendor setting for the pro-
duction of a single item with multiple inputs, under a carbon emission constraint
and non-linear production functions. In both problems, the production quan-
tity is linked to multiple inputs via the Cobb-Douglas and Leontief production
functions which are widely used in the economic theory of production.
In the first problem, we assume a strict carbon cap and find the optimal
production quantity and input allocation that will maximize the expected profit
under this constraint. We construct our problem based on the classical newsven-
dor problem where production costs are generated via production functions. We
derive the optimal production policy that gives the production quantity and input
allocation.
In the second problem, we consider an emission trading scheme that allows
for advance purchase of carbon emission permits made at an initial price before
the realization of random demand is revealed. When the demand and market
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carbon trade prices are revealed, it is possible to buy additional permits or to
sell an excess amount. We provide structural results on the optimal allocation of
the inputs under demand commitment as well as the carbon trading policy that
maximizes the expected profit.
In our numerical study, we analyze both problems under the Cobb-Douglas
production function. In the illustrative example based on a real-life agricultural
production application, we observe that carbon emission can be decreased by
at least 35% without any significant impact on the expected profit and service
level. We also observe that the carbon emission can be reduced by improving
the technology level rather than changing the input allocations and decreasing
the production quantity. Under a given carbon cap, we infer that compared
to producing with the given technology level, improving technology may even
provide side benefits such as higher service levels and possibly higher net expected
profit depending on the technology improvement cost.
The sensitivity analysis on Problem 1 indicates that when our production
system relies more on the input which emits less carbon, the expected profit is
affected less by the carbon cap. This finding provides evidence on the importance
of swiching to less carbon emitting inputs.
The sensitivity study we conduct for Problem 2 shows that relying on high
carbon emitting resources leads to become more dependent on the carbon trade
market. The results present that when the production system mostly depends on
the low cost-high carbon emitting input, we tend to purchase more permit with
the contract and expect to be more active in the emission trading scheme while
obtaining lower expected profit.
For further study, we propose several extensions to our problems. For Problem
1, it would be interesting to consider the multi-echelon extension to our problem.
In the multi-echelon setting, the emission policy makers that set the carbon cap
for the producer may be integrated in the system and the optimal carbon cap
policy that maximizes the overall social utility may be derived. It can also be ex-
tended to include multiple players where the authority may allocate the national
or regional carbon cap to several producers under an objective. This problem
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may also be analyzed under multiple period production systems with technology
investments.
For future study, Problem 2 may be considered without demand commitment.
It may also be analyzed under production prior to demand realization. In this
case, the producer needs to consider the optimal production policy as well as
the optimal carbon contract and trading policies. This problem may also be
considered under options contract design where the producer buys the ability to
purchase emission permits rather than the permits itself. Analyzing this problem
in multiple period horizon with technology improvement may be also interesting.
In our problem, we assume that carbon permits are always available in the market.
It would be interesting to consider the case where there is a fixed amount of
emission available in the market. Finally, we suggest that an interesting extension
may be analyzing this problem with multiple players where the players are given
an initial carbon permit by the authorities and are allowed to trade this permit
with each other.
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Appendix A
Problem 1
Proof of Lemma 4.2
We will prove this by induction. First, we look at the base case where n = 2.
G2 =
(
a1b1 a1a2
a2a1 a2b2
)
∆2 = a1b1a2b2 − (a1a2)2
= a1a2((a1 + c1)(a2 + c2)− a1a2)
= a1a2(a1a2 + a1c2 + a2c1 + c1c2 − a1a2)
= a1a2(c1c2 + a1c2 + a2c1)
= K2
2∑
i=0
ai
2∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
By induction hypothesis, we claim that ∆n = Kn
∑n
i=0 ai
∏n
j=1,j 6=i cj. Then we
prove this equation for n+ 1. We partition Gn+1 as follows
Gn+1 =
(
A11 A12
A21 A22
)
122
where
A11 = G
n
A22 = an+1bn+1
A12 = A
T
21 =
(
an+1a1 an+1a2 ... an+1an
)
Then, we compute ∆n+1 = |A22||A11 − A12A−122 A21|. Note that A−122 = 1an+1bn+1 .
A12A
−1
22 A21 =
1
an+1bn+1

a1an+1
a2an+1
.
.
anan+1

(
an+1a1 an+1a2 ... an+1an
)
=
an+1
bn+1

a1
a2
.
.
an

(
a1 a2 ... an
)
=
an+1
bn+1

a1
2 a1a2 ... a1an
a2a1 a2
2 ... a2an
.
.
ana1 ana2 ... an
2

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Then we consider the following matrix
A11 − A12A−122 A21 =

a1b1 a1a2 ... a1an
a2a1 a2b2 ... a2an
.
.
ana1 ana2 ... anbn

− an+1
bn+1

a1
2 a1a2 ... a1an
a2a1 a2
2 ... a2an
.
.
ana1 ana2 ... an
2

=

a1b1 − an+1bn+1 a12 a1a2
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
... a1an
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
a2a1
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
a2b2 − an+1bn+1 a22 ... a2an
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
.
.
ana1
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
ana2
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
... anbn − an+1bn+1 an2

=

a1
(
b1 − an+1bn+1 a1
)
a1a2
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
... a1an
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
a2a1
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
a2
(
b2 − an+1bn+1 a2
)
... a2an
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
.
.
ana1
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
ana2
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)
... an
(
bn − an+1bn+1 an
)

In the next step, we manipulate the elements in the matrix. We let
bi =
bi − ai an+1bn+1
1− an+1
bn+1
=
bibn+1 − aian+1
bn+1 − an+1
=
(ai + ci)(an+1 + cn+1)− aian+1
an+1 + cn+1 − an+1
=
aian+1 + cian+1 + aicn+1 + cicn+1 − aian+1
cn+1
= ai + ci
(
1 +
an+1
bn+1
)
We let γ = 1− an+1
bn+1
= cn+1
an+1+cn+1
. We also let ci = ci
(
1 + an+1
cn+1
)
= ci
(
an+1+cn+1
cn+1
)
=
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ci
γ
, then bi = ai + ci. Next, we rewrite the above matrix as follows:
A11 − A12A−122 A21 =
(
1− an+1
bn+1
)

a1b1 a1a2 ... a1an
a2a1 a2b2 ... a2an
.
.
ana1 ana2 ... anbn

= γ

a1(a1 + c1) a1a2 ... a1an
a2a1 a2(a2 + c2) ... a2an
.
.
ana1 ana2 ... an(an + cn)

This matrix is an n×n matrix in the form of the matrix G; therefore, we can use
the induction hypothesis to determine the determinant of this matrix.
|A11 − A12A−122 A21| = γnKn
n∑
i=0
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
= γnKn
n∑
i=0
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
γ
= γnKn
(∏n
k=1 ck
γn
+
1
γn−1
n∑
i=1
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
)
= Kn
(
n∏
k=1
ck + γ
n∑
i=1
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
)
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Finally, we evaluate the determinant of the (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix.
∆n+1 = |A22||A11 − A12A−122 A21|
= an+1(an+1 + cn+1)Kn
(
n∏
k=1
ck + γ
n∑
i=1
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
)
= Kn+1
(
n+1∏
k=1
ck + an+1
n∏
k=1
ck +
(an+1 + cn+1)cn+1
an+1 + cn+1
n∑
i=1
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
)
= Kn+1
(
n+1∏
k=1
ck + an+1
n∏
k=1
ck + cn+1
n∑
i=1
ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
)
= Kn+1
n+1∑
i=1
ai
n+1∏
j=1,j 6=i
cj
Hence we showed that ∆n = Kn
∑n
i=0 ai
∏
j 6=i cj.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
In order to show the convexity of the objective function, we first aim to derive
the second order conditions for Problem SP1Ua given by
min
~x
Γ(~x) =
n∑
i=1
pixi
s.t. Q = A
n∏
i=1
xi
αi
We eliminate the production function constraint by substituting x∗n for xn where
x∗n is a function of Q, x1, . . . , xn−1 by Lemma 4.1. Then we have
min
x1,...,xn−1
Γ(x1, . . . , xn−1) =
n−1∑
i=1
pixi + pnx
∗
n
Next, we derive the first order conditions of the objective function.
∂Γ(x1, . . . , xn−1)
∂xi
= pi + pn
(
Q
A
∏n−1
j=1 xj
αj
) 1
αn
(
− αi
αn
)
xi
−1
= pi − pn αi
αn
x∗n
xi
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
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The the second order derivatives are given as follows
∂2Γ(x1, . . . , xn−1)
∂xi2
= pnx
∗
n
(
αi
αn
)(
1 +
αi
αn
)
xi
−2 ∀i = 1, . . . , n− 1
∂2Γ(x1, . . . , xn−1)
∂xi∂xj
= pnx
∗
n
(
αi
αn
)(
αj
αn
)
xi
−1xj−1 ∀i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , n− 1
We let
ai =
αi
αn
xi
−1
ci = xi
−1
bi = ai + ci
Then
∂2Γ(x1, . . . , xn−1)
∂xi2
= pnx
∗
nai(ai + ci) for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
∂2Γ(x1, . . . , xn−1)
∂xi∂xj
= pnx
∗
naiaj for all i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , n− 1
Then the Hessian matrix is H = {hij} where hij = pnxngij for all i, j = 1, .., n−1
where
gii = aibi = ai(ai + ci) for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
gij = aiaj for all i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , n− 1
and G = {gij}. Since all elements in H contain pnx∗n, we can write det(H) =
pnx
∗
n × det(G). By Lemma 4.2,
det(H) = pnx
∗
n
(
n−1∏
i=1
αi
αn
xi
−1
)
n−1∑
i=0
αi
αn
xi
−1
n−1∏
j=1,j 6=i
xi
−1
Since αi > 0 and xi > 0 for all i = 1, .., n, det(H) is positive definite and has
positive definite minors.
Proof of Lemma 4.4
In the previous proof, we already derived the first order condition:
∂Γ(x1, . . . , xn−1)
∂xi
= pi − pn αi
αn
x∗n
xi
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
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At the extrema, we have ∂Γ(x1,...,xn−1)
∂xi
= 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1; therefore, we
obtain the following equations:
pix
∗
i
αi
=
pnx
∗
n
αn
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
from which we get
xi
∗(Q)
xj∗(Q)
=
αi
pi
pj
αj
for all i, j = 1, . . . , n
By Lemma 4.3, this solution holds at optimality.
Proof of Lemma 4.5
We need to check the second derivative of Π(Q) with respect to Q in order to
evaluate the convavity. The first derivative of Π(Q) with respect to Q is
dΠ(Q)
dQ
= (s+ cs)− s+ cs + ceF (Q)− A− 1r
n∏
i=1
(
pi
αi
)αi
r
Q
1
r
−1
For r > 1, the second derivative ofΠ(Q) with respect to Q is
d2Π(Q)
dQ2
= −(s+ cs + ce)f(Q)−
n∑
i=1
pi
A−
1
r
r
(
1
r
− 1
)
αi
pi
n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
−2
For concavity, we need d
2Π(Q)
dQ2
≤ 0. Then,
−(s+ cs + ce)f(Q)− A− 1r
(
1
r
− 1
) n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
−2 ≤ 0
f(Q) ≥ A
− 1
r
s+ cs + ce
(
1− 1
r
) n∏
j=1
(
pj
αj
)αj
r
Q
1
r
−2
If this condition is satisfied, then the objective function turns out to be concave
in Q.
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Proof of Theorem 4.5
Problem SP1Ub is
min
~x
Γ(~x) =
n∑
i=1
pixi
s.t. Q = min
i
{Qi : Qi = Aixi∗αi ,∀i}
We pick an arbitrary input n = argmin{Qi}. Then for a given Q, Qn = Q and
Qi = Q+ i, i ≥ 0 for all resource i = 1, . . . , n− 1. Then we have
xn =
(
Q
An
) 1
αn
xi =
(
Qi
Ai
) 1
αi
=
(
Q+ i
Ai
) 1
αi
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
Then, Problem SP1Ub turns out to be
min
1,...,n−1
Γ(1, . . . , n−1) = pn
(
Q
An
) 1
αn
+
n−1∑
i=1
pi
(
Q+ i
Ai
) 1
αi
s.t. i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
Now, we can look at the first order derivative of the objective function with
respect to i, for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
∂Γ(1, . . . , n−1)
∂i
=
pi
Aiαi
(
Q+ i
A
) 1
αi
−1
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1
The expression above is always positive for i ≥ 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1, which
implies the objective function is strictly increasing in i. Therefore, in order to
minimize the objective function, we have ∗i = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1. Then
we get
xi
∗∗(Q) =
(
Q
A
) 1
αi
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Proof of Lemma 4.11
First we look at the second derivative of the objective function Π(Q) with respect
to Q.
dΠ(Q)
dQ
= s+ cs − (s+ cs + ce)F (Q)−
n∑
i=1
pi
αi
Ai
− 1
αiQ
1
αi
−1
Then we have
d2Π(Q)
dQ2
= −(s+ cs + ce)f(Q)−
n∑
i=1
pi(
1
αi
− 1)
αiAi
1
αi
Q
1
αi
−2
Π(Q) is concave in Q only if d
2Π(Q)
dQ2
≤ 0. Then we have
−(s+ cs + ce)f(Q)−
n∑
i=1
pi(
1
αi
− 1)
αiAi
1
αi
Q
1
αi
−2 ≤ 0
Then, the objective function is concave if the following condition holds:
f(Q) ≥
∑n
i=1
pi(1− 1αi )
αiAi
1
αi
Q
1
αi
−2
s+ cs + ce
Proof of Corollary 4.15
The first derivative of the objective function Π̂(Q) with respect to Q is
dΠ̂(Q)
dQ
= s+ cs − (s+ cs + ce)F (Q)−
n∑
i=1
pi + λβi
αi
Ai
− 1
αiQ
1
αi
−1
At the extrema, we have dΠ(Q)
dQ
= 0. Then, we obtain the following equation at
the optimal solution Q∗∗:
λ∗∗ =
(s+ cs)− (s+ cs + ce)F (Q∗∗)−
∑n
i=1
piQ
∗ 1αi−1
αiAi
1
αi∑n
i=1
βiQ∗
1
αi
−1
αiAi
1
αi
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Appendix B
Problem 2
Proof of Lemma 5.4
In this proof, we will be using Lemmas 5.3 and 5.2, Corollary 5.1 and Definition
5.1. Set  ≡ κ+ qb − qs. Then by Corollary 5.1, we have
 ≡ κ+ qb − qs =
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pj + λβj
αj
)αj
r
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + λβi
1. Suppose κ < κup and qb = 0. Then the only decision variable is qs and
dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)
dqb
do not exist while dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)
dqs
= ps − λ for a given λ by Lemma
5.3. Set ∆κ = κup − κ. Then we have  = κup −∆κ− qs < κup. It implies
λ > pb by Lemma 5.2. Then
dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)
dqs
= ps − λ < ps − pb < 0. It suggests
that Πˆ((0, qs)|κ) is strictly decreasing in qs. Since 0 ≤ qs ≤ κ, q∗s = 0.
2. Suppose κ < κup and qs = 0. Then the only decision variable is qb and
dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)
dqs
do not exist while dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)
dqb
= λ−pb for a given λ by Lemma 5.3.
Set ∆κ = κup − κ.
First, suppose qb ≤ ∆κ. Then we have  = κup −∆κ+ qb ≤ κup. It implies
λ ≥ pb by Lemma 5.2. Then dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)dqb = λ − pb ≥ 0. It suggests that
Πˆ((qb, 0)|κ) is nondecreasing in qb. Since 0 ≤ qb ≤ ∆κ, q∗b = ∆κ.
Now, suppose qb ≥ ∆κ. Then we have  = κup −∆κ+ qb ≥ κup. It implies
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λ ≤ pb by Lemma 5.2. Then dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)dqb = λ − pb ≤ 0. It suggests that
Πˆ((qb, 0)|κ) is nonincreasing in qb. Since qb ≥ ∆κ, q∗b = ∆κ.
In conclusion, q∗b = ∆κ = κup − κ.
3. Suppose κup ≤ κ ≤ κdown and qb = 0. Then the only decision variable is qs
and dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)
dqb
do not exist while dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)
dqs
= ps−λ for a given λ by Lemma
5.3. Set ∆κ = κdown − κ. Then we have  = κdown − ∆κ − qs ≤ κdown. It
implies λ ≥ ps by Lemma 5.2. Then dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)dqs = ps − λ ≤ 0. It suggests
that Πˆ((0, qs)|κ) is nonincreasing in qs. Since 0 ≤ qs ≤ κ, q∗s = 0.
4. Suppose κup ≤ κ ≤ κdown and qs = 0. Then the only decision variable is
qb and
dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)
dqs
do not exist while dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)
dqb
= λ − pb for a given λ by
Lemma 5.3. Set ∆κ = κ− κup. Then we have  = κup + ∆κ+ qb ≥ κup. It
implies λ ≤ pb by Lemma 5.2. Then dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)dqb = λ − pb ≤ 0. It suggests
that Πˆ((qb, 0)|κ) is nonincreasing in qb. Since qb ≥ 0, q∗b = 0 .
5. Suppose κ > κdown and qb = 0. Then the only decision variable is qs and
dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)
dqb
do not exist while dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)
dqs
= ps − λ for a given λ by Lemma
5.3. Set ∆κ = κ− κdown.
First suppose qs ≤ ∆κ. Then we have  = κdown + ∆κ − qs ≥ κdown. It
implies λ ≤ ps by Lemma 5.2. Then dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)dqs = ps − λ ≥ 0. It suggests
that Πˆ((0, qs)|κ) is nondecreasing in qs. Since 0 ≤ qs ≤ ∆κ, q∗s = ∆κ.
Now, suppose qs ≥ ∆κ. Then we have  = κdown + ∆κ − qs ≤ κdown. It
implies λ ≥ ps by Lemma 5.2. Then dΠˆ((0,qs)|κ)dqs = ps − λ ≤ 0. It suggests
that Πˆ((0, qs)|κ) decreases in qs. Since ∆κ ≤ qs ≤ κ, q∗s = ∆κ.
In conclusion, q∗s = ∆κ = κ− κdown.
6. Suppose κ > κdown and qs = 0. Set ∆κ = κ − κdown. Then we have
 = κdown + ∆κ + qb > κdown. It implies λ < ps by Lemma 5.2. Then
dΠˆ((qb,0)|κ)
dqb
= λ − pb < ps − pb < 0. It suggests that Πˆ((qb, 0)|κ) strictly
decreases in qb. Since qb ≥ 0, q∗b = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 5.6
By Corollary 5.7, we have
Π2
∗∗ = sD + λ∗∗κ− r
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
λ∗∗βj + pj
αj
)αj
r
In Theorem 5.1, λ∗∗ values are given as follows:
λ∗∗ =

pb : ifκ > κup
λ : ifκup ≤ κ ≤ κdown
ps : ifκ > κdown
where λ ≡ λ(D, κ) solves Equation 5.12. We can rewrite the conditions for λ∗∗
using Corollary 5.8. Then,
λ∗∗ =

pb : ifD > e(pb, κ)
λ(D, κ) : ife(ps, κ) ≤ D ≤ e(pb, κ)
ps : ifD < e(ps, κ)
where λ(D, κ) solves Equation 5.12. First, we derive ED,pb,ps [Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ)].
We suppress this notation for simplicity as follows: E[Π∗∗2 ].
E[Π∗∗2 ] =sE[D] +
∫
pb,ps
{
∫ e(ps,κ)
0
psκf(D)dD
−
∫ e(ps,κ)
0
r
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
psβj + pj
αj
)αj
r
f(D)dD
+
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
λ(D, κ)κf(D)dD
−
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
r
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
λ(D, κ)βj + pj
αj
)αj
r
f(D)dD
+
∫ ∞
e(pb,κ)
pbκf(D)dD
−
∫ ∞
e(pb,κ)
r
(
D
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pbβj + pj
αj
)αj
r
f(D)dD}g(pb, ps)dpbps
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Now we evaluate
dE[Π∗∗2 ]
dκ
using Leibniz Rule.
dE[Π∗∗2 ]
dκ
=
∫
pb,ps
{de(ps, κ)
dκ
psκf(e(ps, κ)) +
∫ e(ps,κ)
0
psf(D)dD
− de(ps, κ)
dκ
r
(
e(ps, κ)
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
psβj + pj
αj
)αj
r
f(e(ps, κ))
+
de(pb, κ)
dκ
λ(e(pb, κ), κ)κf(e(pb, κ)) +
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
dλ(D, κ)
dκ
κf(D)dD
+
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
λ(D, κ)f(D)dD − de(ps, κ)
dκ
λ(e(ps, κ), κ)κf(e(ps, κ))
− de(pb, κ)
dκ
r
(
e(pb, κ)
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
λ(e(pb, κ), κ)βj + pj
αj
)αj
r
f(e(pb, κ))
−
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
dλ(D, κ)
dκ
(
D
A
)1/r n∏
j=1
(
λ(D, κ)βj + pj
αj
)αj/r
×
n∑
i=1
αiβi
pi + λ(D, κ)βi
f(D)dD
+
de(ps, κ)
dκ
r
(
e(ps, κ)
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
λ(e(ps, κ), κ)βj + pj
αj
)αj
r
f(e(ps, κ))
− de(pb, κ)
dκ
pbκf(e(pb, κ)) +
∫ ∞
e(pb,κ)
pbf(D)dD
+
de(pb, κ)
dκ
r
(
e(pb, κ)
A
) 1
r
n∏
j=1
(
pbβj + pj
αj
)αj
r
f(e(pb, κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
By Lemma 5.5, λ(e(pb, κ), κ) = pb and λ(e(ps, κ), κ) = ps. Then, we obtain
the following result after simplifications:
dE[Π∗∗2 ]
dκ
=
∫
pb,ps
{
∫ e(ps,κ)
0
psf(D)dD +
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
λ(D, κ)f(D)dD
+
∫ ∞
e(pb,κ)
pbf(D)dD}g(pb, ps)dpbps
=
∫
pb,ps
{psF (e(ps, κ∗)) +
∫ e(pb,κ∗)
e(ps,κ∗)
λ(D, κ∗)f(D)dD
+ pbF (e(pb, κ
∗))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
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Then the first order derivative of the objective function in Problem P2.1a with
respect to κ is given by
dΠ1(κ)
dκ
=− c+
∫
pb,ps
{psF (e(ps, κ)) +
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
λ(D, κ)f(D)dD
+ pbF (e(pb, κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
Finally we look at the first order condition dΠ1(κ)
dκ
= 0 as shown below:∫
pb,ps
(
psF (e(ps, κ
∗)) + pbF (e(pb, κ∗)) +
∫ e(pb,κ∗)
e(ps,κ∗)
λ(D,κ∗)f(D)dD
)
g(pb, ps)dpbps = c
Proof of Lemma 5.7
From above we have
dΠ1(κ)
dκ
=− c+
∫
pb,ps
{psF (e(ps, κ)) +
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
λ(D, κ)f(D)dD
+ pbF (e(pb, κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
Now we observe the second derivative with respect to κ.
d2Π1(κ)
dκ2
=
∫
pb,ps
{e′(ps, κ)psf(e(ps, κ)) + e′(pb, κ)λ(e(pb, κ), κ)f(e(pb, κ))
+
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
dλ(D, κ)
dκ
f(D)dD − e′(ps, κ)λ(e(ps, κ), κ)f(e(ps, κ))
− e′(pb, κ)pbf(e(pb, κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
By Lemma 5.5, λ(e(pb, κ), κ) = pb and λ(e(ps, κ), κ) = ps. Then
d2Π1(κ)
dκ2
=
∫
pb,ps
∫ e(pb,κ)
e(ps,κ)
dλ(D, κ)
dκ
f(D)g(pb, ps)dDdpbps
Since dλ(D,κ)
dκ
< 0 by Lemma 5.2, d
2Π1(κ)
dκ2
< 0. The objective function in Problem
P2.2a is concave in κ.
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Proof of Lemma 5.10
By Corollary 5.10. We have
Π2
∗∗ = sD +
psκ−
∑n
i=1(pi + psβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi : if∗∗(D) < κ
pbκ−
∑n
i=1(pi + pbβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi : if∗∗(D) ≥ κ
By using the relation given in Corollary 5.11, we rewrite the equation above as
follows:
Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ) = sD +
psκ−
∑n
i=1(pi + psβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi : ifD < ω(κ)
pbκ−
∑n
i=1(pi + pbβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi : ifD ≥ ω(κ)
Now, we derive ED,pb,ps [Π2((q
∗∗
b , q
∗∗
s ), ~x
∗∗|κ)]. We suppress the notation for sim-
plicity as follows: E[Π∗∗2 ]
E[Π∗∗2 ] =sE[D] +
∫
pb,ps
{
∫ ω(κ)
0
(
psκ−
n∑
i=1
(pi + psβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi
)
f(D)dD
+
∫ ∞
ω(κ)
(
pbκ−
n∑
i=1
(pi + pbβi)
(
D
Ai
) 1
αi
)
f(D)dD}g(pb, ps)dpbps
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Next we evaluate
dE[Π∗∗2 ]
dκ
using Leibniz Rule.
dE[Π∗∗2 ]
dκ
=
∫
pb,ps
{dω(κ)
dκ
(
psκ−
n∑
i=1
(pi + psβi)
(
ω(κ)
Ai
) 1
αi
)
f(ω(κ))
+
∫ ω(κ)
0
psf(D)dD +
∫ ∞
ω(κ)
pbf(D)dD
− dω(κ)
dκ
(
pbκ−
n∑
i=1
(pi + pbβi)
(
ω(κ)
Ai
) 1
αi
)
f(ω(κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
=
∫
pb,ps
{dω(κ)
dκ
ps
(
κ−
n∑
i=1
βi
(
ω(κ)
Ai
) 1
αi
)
f(ω(κ))
− dω(κ)
dκ
n∑
i=1
pi
(
ω(κ)
Ai
) 1
αi
f(ω(κ))
+
∫ ω(κ)
0
psf(D)dD +
∫ ∞
ω(κ)
pbf(D)dD
− dω(κ)
dκ
pb
(
κ−
n∑
i=1
βi
(
ω(κ)
Ai
) 1
αi
)
f(ω(κ))
+
dω(κ)
dκ
n∑
i=1
pi
(
ω(κ)
Ai
) 1
αi
f(ω(κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
=
∫
pb,ps
{
∫ ω(κ)
0
psf(D)dD +
∫ ∞
ω(κ)
pbf(D)dD}g(pb, ps)dpbps
Then the first order derivative of the objective function in Problem P2.1b with
respect to κ is given by
dΠ1(κ)
dκ
=
∫
pb,ps
{ps
(∫ ω(κ)
0
f(D)dD
)
+ pb
(∫ ∞
ω(κ)
f(D)dD
)
}g(pb, ps)dpbps − c
We look at the first order condition dΠ1(κ)
dκ
= 0 as shown below:∫
pb,ps
{ps
∫ ω(κ)
0
f(D)dD + pb
∫ ∞
ω(κ)
f(D)dD}g(pb, ps)dpbps = c
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Proof of Lemma 5.11
The first order derivative of the objective function in Problem P2.1b with respect
to κ is deriven above.
dΠ1(κ)
dκ
=
∫
pb,ps
{ps
∫ ω(κ)
0
f(D)dD + pb
∫ ∞
ω(κ)
f(D)dD}g(pb, ps)dpbps − c
Now we observe the second derivative with respect to κ.
d2Π1(κ)
dκ2
=
∫
pb,ps
{dω(κ)
dκ
psf(ω(κ))− dω(κ)
dκ
pbf(ω(κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
=−
∫
pb,ps
{dω(κ)
dκ
(pb − ps)f(ω(κ))}g(pb, ps)dpbps
Since dω(κ)
dκ
> 0 by Corollary 5.11 and pb > ps by assumption,
d2Π1(κ)
dκ2
< 0. The
objective function in Problem P2.1b is concave in κ.
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Appendix C
Numerical Study
Derivation of Parameters p1 and b1
In the study conducted by Hatırlı et. al [18], the quantity of total fertilizer used
in greenhouse tomato production is found to be 940.9 kg/ha and its energy equiv-
alent is 29443.9 MJ/ha. Thus, the energy equivalent of fertilizer is calculated as
29443.9/940.9 = 31.3 MJ/kg.
In [51], the fertilizer price is given as 4 TL/kg. Then,
p1 =
4 TL/kg
31.3 MJ/kg
= 0.1278 TL/MJ
We base our calculations on the nitrogen fertilizer for the estimation of the
carbon coefficient of the fertilizer. The mean carbon emission of the nitrogen
fertilizer is estimated as 1.3 kg CE/kg [31]. The energy equivalent of nitrogen is
66.14 MJ/kg [18]. Then,
β1 =
1.3 kg CE/kg
66.14 MJ/kg
= 0.0197 kg CE/MJ
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Derivation of Parameters p2 and b2
We base our calculations on the insecticides for the estimation of the price
and carbon coefficient of the chemicals. The energy equivalent of chemicals is
101.2 MJ/kg [18]. The price of the insecticide is 60 TL/lt [9]. Assuming that
1 lt is equal to 1 kg, the price is 60 TL/kg. The average carbon emission of the
insecticide is estimated as 5.1 kg CE/kg [31]. Then,
p2 =
60 TL/kg
101.2 MJ/kg
= 0.5929 TL/MJ
β2 =
5.1 kg CE/kg
101.2 MJ/kg
= 0.0504 kg CE/MJ
Derivation of Parameter p3 and b3
The energy equivalent of labor is 2.3 MJ/h [18]. The daily salary of workers is
24 TL/day = 3 TL/h [1].
p3 =
3 TL/h
2.3 MJ/h
= 1.3043 TL/MJ
We base our estimation of carbon coefficient of the labor on the plant/sow/drill
operations. Lal [31] estimates the average carbon emission of theses operations
to be 3.2 kg CE/ha. Manually operated seed drill operation takes 35 h/ha [11].
β3 =
3.2 kg CE/ha
35 h/ha× 2.3 MJ/h = 0.0398 kg CE/MJ
Derivation of Parameter p4 and b4
The energy equivalent of machinery is 64.8 MJ/h [18]. The cost of diesel fuel is
3.83 TL/lt [40]. A diesel tractor rated at 100 maximum PTO-hp operating at
full load is 7.69 gal/h [10].
p4 =
3.83 TL/lt× 7.69 gal/h
0.264gal/lt× 64.8 MJ/h = 1.7217 TL/MJ
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For diesel fuel, 1gal = 7lb [50]. Lal [31] estimates the mean carbon emission
of diesel fuel to be 0.94 kg CE/kg. Then,
β4 =
0.94 kg CE/kg × 0.4536 kg/lb× 7 lb/gal × 7.69 gal/h
64.8 MJ/h
= 0.3542 kg CE/MJ
Derivation of Parameter p5 and b5
The energy equivalent of water for irrigation is 0.63 MJ/m3 [18]. We base our
estimation of price and carbon coefficient of water for irrigation on the furrow
irrigation systems. The operating cost of water for irrigation is 36 TL/da/year
[2]. Robinson et. al. [43] estimate the water consumption in furrow irriga-
tion to be 1850 − 2400 m3/ha/year. We use the mean value in our calcula-
tions which is 2125 m3/ha/year. The carbon emission of furrow irrigation is
395 kg CE/ha/year [31]. Then,
p5 =
36 TL/da/year × 10 da/ha
2125 m3/ha/year × 0.63 MJ/m3 = 0.2689 TL/MJ
β5 =
395 kg CE/ha/year
2125 m3/ha/year × 0.63 MJ/m3 = 0.2951 TL/MJ
Derivation of Parameter A
Parameter Elasticity Energy equivalent (MJ)
fertilizer 0.24 29443.9
chemical 0.19 10872.5
labor 0.15 9222.6
machinery 0.56 3041.1
water for irrigation 0.23 389.7
tomato - 127748.6
Table C.1: Energy equivalents of the inputs and yield in greenhouse tomato
production given in [18]
We derive the value of the technology level A from Equation 3.4 based on the
values provided in [18] (Table C). Then, A is found to be 1.34.
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Derivation of Parameter s
The tomato selling price is assumed to be 2.3 TL/kg. The energy equivalent of
tomato is 0.8 MJ/kg [18]. Then,
s =
2.3 TL/kg
0.8 MJ/kg
= 2.875 TL/MJ
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